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The Building Safety Regulator: Building a better regulator

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The Industry and Regulators Committee

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See Appendix 1.

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Q in footnotes refers to a question in oral evidence.

SUMMARY

The loss of 72 lives at the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 was tragic, and exposed a system of regulating building safety that was not fit for purpose. Subsequent reviews found that many construction products were not regulated, and even those that were subject to the relevant standards were often misleadingly marketed and inappropriately used. Building inspectors were chosen by the company applying, providing a commercial incentive not to enforce the Building Regulations too rigorously.

Following the recommendations of an independent review by Dame Judith Hackitt in 2018, Parliament legislated to create a Building Safety Regulator (BSR) within the Health and Safety Executive through the Building Safety Act 2022. The new regulator was given responsibility for approving the construction of new high-rise buildings and of any changes to existing high-rise buildings. It was also given responsibility for certifying that all residential high-rise buildings are safe, and regulating building inspectors and building control bodies that work on medium and low-rise buildings to ensure their competence.

The introduction of the BSR was a necessary and welcome step, and we heard that it has brought increased scrutiny to the design, construction and management of buildings in the interest of safety.

Delays

Despite this, there is an urgent need for the BSR to improve on how it operates its new framework. We heard consistent and repeated complaints that the BSR could take more than nine months to make decisions on whether construction projects should be allowed to go ahead, significantly longer than the statutory target of twelve weeks for these decisions. In many cases, this has delayed or disincentivised refurbishments, safety upgrades and the remediation of dangerous cladding in high-rise buildings, leaving residents in unsafe buildings for longer and increasing costs for leaseholders.

These delays have also had a worrying impact on the delivery of new housing in high-rise buildings. As we were told by the BSR's new Chair, Andy Roe, not having sufficient housing also causes safety issues, increasing overcrowding and homelessness. While high-rise buildings are a minority of our housing stock, they are essential to deliver new housing in large cities. These delays have hampered the delivery of the new homes that the country needs, slowing progress towards the Government's target of building 1.5 million new homes in this Parliament. Other factors, such as skills and planning, are also a constraint, but resolving the unacceptable delays caused by the BSR will be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of meeting the target.

Skills

We heard several reasons for these delays. Initially, the BSR seconded in members of the multidisciplinary teams (MDTs) that make its building control decisions, which led to delays in even setting up the teams necessary to make decisions. The BSR has accepted that this was not working and is now recruiting in-house capacity to make decisions on new-build applications and contracting out remediation applications to large engineering firms. These moves are welcome, although only time will tell if they can significantly speed up approvals.

Whether this expertise sits within the BSR or not, we heard repeatedly that there are not sufficient skilled building and fire inspectors to staff the BSR and other organisations, such as local authority building control bodies and fire and rescue services. The Government must provide long-term funding for the training of new building inspectors, fire safety professionals and structural engineers as part of its forthcoming Construction Skills Action Plan.

Relations with industry

Applicants to the BSR complained that it was unclear what information they needed to provide to have their projects approved, and that the regulator refused to communicate clearly with applicants about their projects. We heard that progress had been made during our inquiry, with the publication of new guidance on the BSR's requirements and an increase in communication between the BSR and applicants. We welcome that progress is being made, although it is disappointing that it has taken so long to reach this position. The BSR must continue to work with industry to clarify its requirements.

We also heard suggestions that some in the construction industry had been quicker to step up to meet the new requirements than others. The BSR told us that it regularly receives applications that contain significant building safety issues, such as an inability to show how buildings have been designed to avoid collapse or the inclusion of designs that applicants know would pump smoke into fire exits. The need to request further information from these applicants then takes more time and requires more resources from the regulator. While the BSR must be clearer and improve its own processes, the construction industry must also play its part in raising standards, and it reflects poorly on the sector that many applications are delayed due to basic errors.

Process efficiencies

We also heard that BSR processes had contributed to delays, particularly requiring a large amount of up-front information before construction could commence. This was a necessary change from the previous situation, where developers could decide and change critical safety features after construction had commenced. However, we feel that the BSR has overcorrected for this problem, and we welcome that the BSR is now planning to take a more staged approach to its approvals, allowing construction to commence without requiring the full design of non-safety critical features. The regulator will have to find a well-judged balance in determining what needs to be approved when.

The BSR is currently responsible for all building work in residential high-rise buildings, even smaller, less-safety critical works such as domestic renovations. This ties up scarce skilled professionals on smaller works, while subjecting leaseholders to significant delays and costs. We welcome the BSR's new more flexible approach, allowing building inspectors with a more appropriate class of qualification to work on smaller, less safety-critical Category B works. However, there is a need to go further and the Government must act without delay to remove some of these works from the BSR's building control approvals altogether or provide a more streamlined process for them.

Construction products

The Government has also brought forward plans for greater regulation of construction products, to provide a greater level of confidence in the materials

used in buildings. We support these proposals, which are particularly important to end the current position where only some products are covered by relevant standards and can be regulated.

Reforms

The Government is also planning to remove the BSR from the Health and Safety Executive and set it up as a new, separate organisation. We support the Government's broader ambition to introduce a single construction regulator, bringing together building safety and construction products regulation, but there are concerns that organisational changes could distract from the immediate imperative of improving the BSR's operational performance, and we suggest that further change should wait until performance improves.

We also welcome that the Government and the BSR have recognised the urgency of rectifying the unacceptable performance that has been delivered so far. Changes have already been made over the course of our inquiry and further action is planned. It would have been worrying had this not been the case, and the job is far from complete, but a start has been made. Close attention from both the Government and the BSR will be needed, and swift additional action is necessary, with our recommendations setting out several areas for further improvement. Without this, there is little chance that the Government will meet its targets to build new homes and remediate dangerous cladding. Failure on either count will leave people in unsafe living conditions unnecessarily.

The Building Safety Regulator: Building a better regulator

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background

1. We have now passed the eighth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire, which took place on 14 June 2017 in North Kensington in London and killed 72 people. Samantha Dixon MP, the Minister for Building Safety at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, told us that “at the heart of everything we do, we have to remember the 72 people who lost their lives and should be with us, living good and long lives, as well as those who were bereaved and those who survived them”.¹
2. Shortly after the tragedy, Dame Judith Hackitt was commissioned to lead an Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. The Review published its final report in May 2018 and made recommendations for a new regulatory framework.² We discuss these recommendations in Chapter 2.
3. Following the report, the Building Safety Act 2022 established the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as the regulator overseeing building safety in England, Scotland and Wales. The HSE, Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety, set up the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) within its organisation to perform this function.³ In October 2023, the BSR became the Building Control Authority for all higher-risk buildings (HRBs) in England. HRBs are new residential buildings over 18 metres or seven storeys, and hospitals and care homes meeting the same height threshold.
4. The Government has pledged to build 1.5 million homes by 2029.⁴ However, the new regulatory framework has caused delays to the approval and construction of new high-rise residential buildings.⁵ Existing buildings have also experienced delays to receiving safety improvements because of the BSR’s processes.⁶ We explore the impacts of these delays in Chapter 2 of this report.
5. The BSR does not currently regulate those who make or sell construction products—this is the responsibility of the Office for Product Safety and Standards (OPSS). The Government plans to set up a new single regulator in 2028 which will regulate both building safety and construction products.⁷ Chapter 3 of this report assesses the BSR’s current organisational status and its relationships with other authorities, including the OPSS and those responsible for low-rise and mid-rise buildings.

1 [Q 126](#) (Samantha Dixon)

2 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report*, [Cm 9607](#), May 2018

3 Health and Safety Executive, [FAQ Explainer—Building Safety Regulator as the Building Control Authority](#), November 2024, p 1

4 Labour Party, [Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024](#), June 2024


5 [Q 11](#) (Matt Joyce)

6 [Q 14](#) (Liam Spender, Giles Grover)

7 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Press Release: Reforms to Building Safety Regulator to accelerate housebuilding](#), 30 June 2025

6. Chapter 4 is concerned with the relationship between the BSR and the housing sector and whether the BSR's guidance, communication, engagement with and feedback to applicants are sufficiently clear and accessible.
7. The BSR have told us that they are considering ways to improve their processes, including working on an organisation-by-organisation basis rather than building-by-building, providing applicants with additional opportunities to submit details during the construction process (referred to as 'staged approvals'), and having different processes for significant structural and safety-critical work and more minor, non-safety related work. This is the focus of Chapter 5 of this report.
8. In June 2025, shortly after this inquiry was launched, the Government announced reforms to the BSR. These reforms included moving the BSR out of the Health and Safety Executive, making changes to the BSR's leadership, and providing additional investment in resources and skills.⁸ The BSR's resources and skills are discussed in Chapter 6.

Figure 1: Timeline of the Building Safety Regulator's establishment



This inquiry

9. We launched our inquiry on 18 June 2025 to examine the work of the Building Safety Regulator.
10. We subsequently received 147 written evidence submissions and held eight oral evidence sessions with a total of 21 witnesses ranging from developers and housing associations, representatives of campaign groups and representatives of other organisations and regulators which work closely with the BSR.
11. We also heard from Dame Judith Hackitt, who chaired the Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety, Andy Roe, who is the BSR's new Non-Executive Chair, Charlie Pugsley, the BSR's new Chief Executive, and Minister Samantha Dixon MBE MP—the Minister for Building Safety at the time of the publication of this report. We are very grateful to all those who contributed.
12. **We make this report for debate.**

⁸ Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [*Press Release: Reforms to Building Safety Regulator to accelerate housebuilding*](#), 30 June 2025

CHAPTER 2: IMPACTS ON BUILDING SAFETY AND NEW CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

13. The Building Act 1984 provides relevant national authorities with the power to make regulations to secure the health, safety and welfare of those who are affected by buildings with respect to their design and construction, and the services, fittings and equipment provided in connection with buildings.⁹ The current requirements are contained in the Building Regulations 2010, which cover the construction of buildings, extensions and alteration projects.¹⁰
14. At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, compliance with the Building Regulations for such projects was checked and approved either by local authority building control bodies, or by private approved building inspectors. The party undertaking building work could choose who provided the building control regulatory oversight.¹¹
15. Following the Grenfell Tower fire, the Government commissioned Dame Judith Hackitt to conduct an Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. The Review's final report, published in 2018, found that the regulatory system for high-rise residential buildings was "highly complex", involving multiple routes, regulators and duty-holders.¹²
16. The Review found that the ability of building control applicants to choose their own regulator provided an incentive for competitors to "attract business by offering minimal interventions or supportive interpretations to contractors", and a disincentive to use enforcement methods "for fear of losing long-term business".¹³
17. The Review suggested that many building control inspectors had worked in "such an integrated fashion with design and construction teams that there can be a confusion and a potential conflict of interest" between their regulatory role and the provision of third-party advice.¹⁴
18. The Review recommended that one regulatory body should oversee building safety across the life cycle of higher-risk residential buildings, to ensure that regulatory oversight is "completely independent of clients, designers and contractors and that enforcement can and does take place where necessary".¹⁵
19. Parliament legislated to create this regulatory body, the Building Safety Regulator (BSR), as part of the Building Safety Act 2022.¹⁶ The BSR was set up within the Health and Safety Executive, Great Britain's national regulator for workplace health and safety.¹⁷
20. The Act made the BSR the building control authority for higher-risk buildings (HRBs) in England.¹⁸ This means that the BSR is now responsible for

9 Building Act 1984, [section 1](#)

10 The Building Regulations 2010 ([SI 2010/2214](#))

11 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report*, [Cm 9607](#), May 2018

12 *Ibid.*

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.*

16 Building Safety Act 2022, [Part 2](#)

17 Health and Safety Executive, [Our mission and priorities](#)

18 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 32](#)

ensuring that the construction of new HRBs, and any relevant alterations to existing HRBs, are carried out in accordance with the Building Regulations. Buildings are designated as higher risk if they are: at least 18 metres in height or have at least seven storeys;¹⁹ and a building containing at least two residential units, a care home or a hospital.²⁰ As of 19 November 2025, there were 13,303 registered HRBs in England.²¹

21. The BSR operates three new ‘gateways’ for HRBs, as recommended by Dame Judith Hackitt’s Review, which usually operate sequentially.²²
 - (1) Gateway 1 is the BSR’s role as a statutory consultee during the planning application process for new HRBs, meaning that local planning authorities must consult the BSR prior to a decision being made on the planning application.²³
 - (2) At Gateway 2, the BSR currently operates a “hard stop” that requires applicants to demonstrate that their proposed building work will result in a compliant building before construction can begin. This involves a “rigorous assessment”, in the words of the BSR, by a Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT), which typically includes a Registered Building Inspector (RBI), a fire safety professional and other relevant professionals, including structural engineers.
 - (3) At Gateway 3, the BSR approves the completed building work and allows the building to be occupied. Any major changes to the design during construction must also be approved by the BSR.²⁴
22. Until recently, the BSR had seconded in MDT members from other organisations, such as local authority building control bodies and fire and rescue services (FRSs).²⁵ The organisation of MDTs and the provision of the necessary skilled staff is discussed further in Chapter 6.
23. Local authority building control bodies and private building inspectors can still provide building control approvals for non-HRBs. However, they must now register with and demonstrate their competence to the BSR, which has been given responsibility for regulating the broader building control profession.²⁶ These matters are discussed further in Chapter 3.
24. In addition to its building control role for HRBs, the BSR also has key responsibilities for the ongoing safety of HRBs. It holds a register of all HRBs to ensure that their location is known and that critical information about them is available. All existing occupied HRBs were required to be registered with the BSR by 30 September 2023.

19 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 31](#)

20 The Higher-Risk Buildings (Descriptions and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2023 ([SI 2023/275](#))

21 Correspondence, *Chief Executive of the Building Safety Regulator to the Chair of the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee*, 26 November 2025

22 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

23 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Consultation and pre-decision matters*, March 2014, updated April 2022

24 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

25 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

26 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 42](#)

25. The BSR also must assess all occupied HRBs and provide them with a Building Assessment Certificate (BAC).²⁷ The BAC process provides an assessment of whether those responsible for safety in HRBs are complying with their duties, including assessing and managing safety risks, engaging with residents and reporting safety incidents. The BSR is aiming to assess applications for BACs over a five-year period, prioritising tranches of buildings based on risk factors including height and cladding type.²⁸
26. The Building Safety Act 2022 requires that each HRB must have at least one “accountable person”, who either holds legal possession of any part of the common parts of the building, such as corridors or staircases, or who is under relevant obligations in relation to common parts of the building. The Act also places duties on a “principle accountable person” who is responsible for ensuring the building’s compliance with Building Regulations.²⁹ Information on these accountable persons is included in the BSR’s register of HRBs.
27. Dame Judith Hackitt’s Independent Review also recommended that a “golden thread of information” about each higher-risk residential building should be created for new buildings, detailing its initial design intent through to construction and including any changes made during each building’s occupation.³⁰
28. The Higher-Risk Buildings (Keeping and Provision of Information etc.) (England) Regulations 2024 require accountable persons for each higher-risk building to keep the golden thread of information.³¹ The BSR told us that it checks that the accountable person for each higher-risk building has the golden thread of information in a form that allows them to assess and manage building safety risks.³²

Impact of BSR on safety of buildings

29. Many witnesses argued that the introduction of the BSR had improved the awareness and focus of housing developers and those who own and manage buildings on the safety of their buildings, and provided greater scrutiny of

27 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

28 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

29 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 72–77](#)

30 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report*, [Cm 9607](#), May 2018

31 The Higher-Risk Buildings (Keeping and Provision of Information etc.) (England) Regulations 2024 ([SI 2024/41](#))

32 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

their work.³³ Helen Fisher, Director of the Cladding Safety Scheme at Homes England, said that the introduction of the BSR had been “a crucial cultural shift in the market”, which had been “necessary”.³⁴

30. Dan Hollas, Director of Building Safety at Clarion Housing Group, explained that five of the housing association’s buildings had been called in for Building Assessment Certificates.³⁵ He said that the process of providing information on the building and its management had made Clarion “coherently justify the work we had done and the approach we were taking”.³⁶ He suggested that Clarion “learned a lot” and that the process had made a difference to the buildings and how the housing association operated.³⁷
31. Cast Consult Limited suggested that the Gateway 2 process led to “more visible focus on building regulations compliance earlier in the design process”, less reliance on building control professionals and more collaboration with contractors and supply chains, resulting in “more ‘buildable’ designs”.³⁸ Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, argued that the “most significant achievement” of the BSR is having “driven cultural change and shifted the paradigm to one of quality design and build”.³⁹
32. Pamela Oparaocha, Assistant Commissioner for Fire Safety at the London Fire Brigade (LFB), said that there is “clear evidence that the gateways

33 [Q 1](#) (Dan Hollas, Matt Voyce), [Q 26](#) (Pamela Oparaocha), [Q 51](#) (Ben Oram), [Q 63](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), [Q 82](#) (Darren Ettles), and written evidence from Shaun Williams ([BSR0010](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Gentoo Group ([BSR0034](#)), Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Design Fire Consultants Limited ([BSR0041](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management Ltd ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Riskflag ([BSR0057](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership Ltd ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), Procure Plus ([BSR0084](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Kent Fire and Rescue Service ([BSR0089](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from The Property Institute ([BSR0105](#)), written evidence from Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Wates Group ([BSR0122](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Environmental Technologists ([BSR0123](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from Douglas Lockyer ([BSR0155](#)), written evidence from Vastint UK ([BSR0158](#)) and written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#))

34 [Q 38](#) (Helen Fisher)

35 [Q 1](#) (Dan Hollas)

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.*

38 Written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)). See also written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)) and written evidence from Riskflag ([BSR0057](#)).

39 [Q 126](#) (Andy Roe)

are driving change”.⁴⁰ She outlined her experience of a joint visit between the LFB and the BSR to a building as part of the Gateway 3 process that found “a number of issues with the building”, allowing them to speak to the accountable person about remediation before approval was given for occupation.⁴¹

33. Principle Estate Management welcomed the BSR’s focus on “preventing unsafe buildings from being constructed in the first place”, while Siderise Group said that the scrutiny of design had led to “challenges being identified earlier”, giving appropriate time to consider solutions that previously would have been resolved on site “and would have potentially not been as robust”.⁴²
34. Several witnesses, such as the Chartered Institute of Housing, suggested that while the BSR has brought greater awareness and focus to building safety, it was “too early to conclude that safety on the ground has improved consistently or measurably”.⁴³
35. Some witnesses suggested that the BSR had not improved safety, pointing to operational challenges and delays in BSR processes holding up construction work.⁴⁴ These matters are discussed further in the following section on delays. Some, such as Ross Gissane, suggested that while there has been an increased awareness and documentation of safety, there has not been “consistent improvement in actual safety outcomes”.⁴⁵
36. The Building Safety Regulator argued that its work had already positively impacted those who live in HRBs by identifying buildings with “serious deficiencies” that required intervention to manage risks to resident safety.⁴⁶ The BSR explained that as of 29 August 2025, over 77% of BAC applications were rejected for a variety of reasons, including failures to make a proper assessment of building safety risks, insufficient demonstration that all reasonable steps were being taken to manage identified risks, and, in a small number of cases, a lack of any consideration of structural failure.⁴⁷
37. The BSR’s Chief Inspector of Buildings, Philip White, explained that the industry’s performance at Gateway 1 had already improved, with the BSR now having to comment on only 17% of applications, down from 57% or

40 Q 26 (Pamela Oparaocha)

41 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from the National Fire Chiefs Council (BSR0066).

42 Written evidence from Principle Estate Management (BSR0036) and written evidence from Siderise Group (BSR0043). See also written evidence from Vistry West London (BSR0071).

43 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Housing (BSR0092). See also written evidence from Syprian Pitkin (BSR0007), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited (BSR0012), written evidence from Anonymous (BSR0027), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis (BSR0044), written evidence from Neil Walton (BSR0056), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd (BSR0088), written evidence from Association for Rental Living (BSR0096), written evidence from FBM Architects (BSR0139), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control (BSR0141), written evidence from Douglas Lockyer (BSR0155)

44 Written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited (BSR0001), written evidence from Michael Sanders (BSR0004), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin (BSR0007), written evidence from Scape Living plc (BSR0040), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis (BSR0044), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd (BSR0068), written evidence from Enframe Consulting (BSR0098), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing (BSR0130), written evidence from Barratt Redrow (BSR0131), written evidence from Build UK (BSR0155) and written evidence from Graystar (BSR0167)

45 Written evidence from Ross Gissane (BSR0047). See also written evidence from Design Fire Consultants Limited (BSR0041), written evidence from Unite Students (BSR0078) and written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited (BSR0080).

46 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator (BSR0156)

47 *Ibid.*

58%. He argued that the BSR is having to reject many Gateway 2 applications because of insufficient demonstration of fire and structural safety, which has “avoided risks being built into those buildings”.⁴⁸ Delays and rejections of Gateway 2 applications are discussed further in the following section.

Delays

38. The Building (Higher-Risk Buildings Procedures) (England) Regulations 2023 require the BSR to decide building control applications for new higher-risk buildings within twelve weeks, unless the regulator and the applicant agree an extension in writing.⁴⁹ For existing HRBs, the BSR is required to decide applications within eight weeks of the application, unless an extension is agreed.⁵⁰
39. We heard extensive evidence that these targets are not being met, including from the BSR, which said that the “significant challenges” it has faced in delivering the new regime, particularly at Gateway 2, mean that processing times are “far in excess of statutory targets and longer than the BSR would wish”.⁵¹
40. In the first three-month period for which the BSR published data on its building control approvals, January to March 2025, only 33% of decisions were made on time. Within this period, the median average time taken for the BSR to make decisions was 17.7 weeks, although this includes applications that were invalidated, which took two weeks on average. The average time taken to reject applications was 21.5 weeks, while the average time to approve applications was 25.1 weeks.⁵²
41. Mark Reynolds, Co-Chair of the Construction Leadership Council, told us that some approvals had taken over 40 weeks, with a number of other

48 [Q 110](#) (Philip White). See also [Q 132](#) (Andy Roe)

49 The Building (Higher-Risk Buildings Procedures) (England) Regulations 2023 ([SI 2023/909](#))

50 *Ibid.*

51 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#)). See also [Q 11](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 14](#) (Liam Spender, Giles Grover), [Q 38](#) (Mark Reynolds), [Q 50](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 83](#) (Lorna Stimpson, Darren Ettles), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0027](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Paul Hadaway ([BSR0035](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Mineral Products Association ([BSR0113](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Buildings ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Wates Group ([BSR0122](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from Finishes and Interiors Sector ([BSR0140](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)), written evidence from Ridge and Partners LLP ([BSR0142](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)), written evidence from Vastint UK ([BSR0158](#)), written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)), written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#)), and written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#))

52 Building Safety Regulator, [Building control approval application data, October 2023 to March 2025](#), July 2025

submissions indicating that they had experienced delays of this length or longer.⁵³

42. The potential causes of delays in BSR decisions are discussed in further detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This chapter is focused on the impacts of those delays on works to existing HRBs and the construction of new housing in HRBs.

Impact on existing buildings

43. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry's Phase 1 report found that the principal reason that the fire spread so rapidly around the building was the combustible cladding on its external wall system, which "acted as a source of fuel".⁵⁴
44. Since the Grenfell Tower fire, efforts have been made to remediate high-rise buildings with unsafe cladding, including through the Building Safety Fund, which provided funding for buildings over 18m in height between 2020 and 2025,⁵⁵ and its successor, the Cladding Safety Scheme, which was launched in 2023 and funds remediation in residential buildings over 11m in height in England.⁵⁶
45. In December 2024, the Government published a Remediation Acceleration Plan, which argued that "there are far too many residential buildings today still with unsafe cladding and the speed with which this is being addressed is far too slow". The Plan set two targets to be achieved by the end of 2029:
 - All buildings over 18m in height with unsafe cladding in a government-funded scheme will have been remediated;
 - Every building over 11m in height with unsafe cladding will either have been remediated, have a date for completion, or the landlords will be liable for severe penalties.⁵⁷
46. As at the end of October 2025, there are 5,570 residential buildings that are 11 metres and over in height that have been identified as requiring the remediation of dangerous cladding in England through Government programmes. Due to uncertainty as to how many buildings have unsafe cladding, the Government estimates that this is between 65% and 97% of all buildings expected to be remediated as part of its programmes, having identified 1,773 more buildings since reporting began in October 2023. To date, 1,946 buildings, 35% of the total, have completed remediation works.

53 [Q 38](#) (Mark Reynolds). See also [Q 50](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Ltd ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Scape Living ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)) and written evidence from Vastint UK ([BSR0158](#))

54 Grenfell Tower Inquiry, *Phase 1 Report Overview*, October 2019

55 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Building Safety Fund: Information for leaseholders and residents*, March 2022, updated September 2025

56 Homes England, *Cladding Safety Scheme overview*, July 2023, updated September 2025

57 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Remediation Acceleration Plan*, December 2024

Work is underway in 759 others, meaning that 49% of buildings have either started or completed remediation works.⁵⁸

47. Many witnesses stressed that delays in the BSR's building control approvals had held up the maintenance of existing HRBs, including delaying the removal of dangerous cladding.⁵⁹ Between January and March 2025, it took the BSR a median average of 22.7 weeks to make decisions on applications for the remediation of higher-risk buildings, with a median average of 37.3 weeks taken to approve remediation applications.⁶⁰
48. Witnesses told us about how these delays had impacted on residents. Grenfell United suggested that up to one million flat dwellers are impacted by identified life safety defects.⁶¹ Liam Spender, a Trustee at the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership said that "a lot" of buildings that need remediation "have been held up as a result of delays" in BSR approvals.⁶² End Our Cladding Scandal Co-Lead Giles Grover said that those living in unsafe buildings have "been through absolute hell", facing falling property values and rising insurance costs, and they "are still trapped and are desperate for work to start".⁶³

58 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release—October 2025*, November 2025

59 [Q 14](#) (Liam Spender, Giles Grover), [Q 52](#) (Ben Oram), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Comer Home Group ([BSR0006](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Royal Berkshire Hospital Foundation Trust ([BSR0014](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Internet Services Providers Association ([BSR0023](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management Ltd ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Open Society Foundation ([BSR0049](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0060](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from Irwin Mitchell ([BSR0065](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0072](#)), written evidence from Chris O'Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Christopher Illsley ([BSR0077](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Parq Brighton ([BSR0083](#)), written evidence from Procure Plus ([BSR0084](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from Essential Living ([BSR0095](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from The Property Institute ([BSR0105](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0111](#)), written evidence from Pamela Street ([BSR0114](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Buildings ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists ([BSR0123](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow plc ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from Unite Group ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from Royal Institute of British Architects ([BSR0137](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#)), and written evidence from Mobile UK & Mobile Infrastructure Forum ([BSR0169](#))

60 Building Safety Regulator, *Building control approval application data, October 2023 to March 2025*, July 2025

61 Written evidence from Grenfell United ([BSR0015](#))

62 [Q 14](#) (Liam Spender)

63 [Q 14](#) (Giles Grover)

49. Parq Brighton, a resident management company,⁶⁴ explained that it was 18 months into its remediation when the project fell under the responsibility of the BSR, having completed 80% of the total works.⁶⁵ They reported that the final phase of works had not been approved following an application in December 2024, meaning that “leaseholders and tenants who have lived in a building site and in apartments shrouded by scaffolding and plastic sheeting for over 18 months will have to endure similar conditions for even longer”.⁶⁶ Pamela Street, a leaseholder in a building identified as needing cladding remediation in 2019, argued that the application had “just been sent back to the drawing board for the most irrelevant technical reason”, suggesting that residents “have quite simply had enough”.⁶⁷
50. Another resident management company, Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited, reported that it had taken 12 months to receive approval for the urgent repair of roof leaks, leading to “two rounds of expensive temporary repairs”.⁶⁸ Other witnesses reported being unable to progress the updating of fire doors or the replacement of “mouldy, single-glazed windows”, among other projects held up by delays.⁶⁹
51. Rendall and Rittner, a managing agent, noted that some works can be designated as emergency work and avoid requiring gateway approvals.⁷⁰ However, they explained that the BSR has decided that the installation of a fire alarm system to replace a waking watch⁷¹ is not emergency work, meaning that gateway delays are preventing the timely replacement of waking watches.⁷²
52. Thomson Brothers, a company specialising in domestic flat refurbishments, argued that the cost of building control applications to the BSR is

64 The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 provides a right for leaseholders to acquire the management functions of their building by transfer to a company set up by them, which can be referred to as a resident management company or Right to Manage company. Leasehold Advisory Service, *Right to Manage* [accessed 2 October 2025]

65 Written evidence from Parq Brighton (BSR0083)

66 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from Principle Estate Management (BSR0036), written evidence from HomeGround Management Limited (BSR0048), written evidence from the Bernard Taylor Partnership (BSR0067), written evidence from Unite Students (BSR0078), written evidence from Knight Dragon (BSR0087), written evidence from The Property Institute (BSR0105), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis (BSR0119), written evidence from G15 (BSR0121), written evidence from Barratt Redrow (BSR0131), and written evidence from Graystar (BSR0167)

67 Written evidence from Pamela Street (BSR0114)

68 Written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited (BSR0031)

69 Written evidence from Rendall and Rittner (BSR0064), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd (BSR0068). See also written evidence from Liftworks Limited (BSR0005), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited (BSR0012), written evidence from Royal Berkshire Hospital Foundation Trust (BSR0014), written evidence from Anonymous (BSR0037), written evidence from Anonymous (BSR0072), written evidence from Christopher Illsley (BSR0077), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited (BSR0080), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd (BSR0088), written evidence from Essential Living (BSR0095), written evidence from Enframe Consulting (BSR0098), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group (BSR0135), written evidence from the National Housing Federation (BSR0145), and written evidence from the City of London Corporation (BSR0165).

70 Written evidence from Rendall and Rittner (BSR0064)

71 A waking watch is a fire safety system in which suitably trained staff continually patrol the floors and exterior perimeter of a building at all times. This maintains the safety of its occupants from fire by ensuring sufficient warning to support an evacuation strategy. The Leasehold Advisory Service estimated that the provision of a waking watch had led to average costs to leaseholders of £17,897 per building and £331 per flat. Leasehold Advisory Service, *What is waking watch?*

72 Written evidence from Rendall and Rittner (BSR0064). See also written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited (BSR0031), written evidence from Principle Estate Management (BSR0036), and written evidence from HomeGround Management Ltd (BSR0064).

“prohibitively expensive for most residents, with the total cost often being greater than the cost of the actual building work carried out”. They suggested that “unpredictable delays ... exacerbate the burden” and disincentivise “essential refurbishment works which prevent existing HRBs from falling into disrepair”.⁷³

53. Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, said that he is “very conscious” that residents and leaseholders awaiting remediation of cladding “have been living in wholly unsatisfactory circumstances for a very long time”. He accepted that the BSR needs to “do better in that space” and think about how to increase capacity.⁷⁴ Samantha Dixon MP, Minister for Building Safety, said that the needs of residents and leaseholders are “at the forefront” of her mind, stressing that some “are in a truly desperate situation.”⁷⁵

Impact on new buildings

54. In its 2024 Manifesto, the Labour Party committed to a target of building 1.5 million homes over the current Parliament.⁷⁶ The previous Conservative Government’s 2019 Manifesto had set a target of building 300,000 homes a year by the mid-2020s, with at least one million more homes to be delivered over the course of the 2019–24 Parliament.⁷⁷
55. In the most recent year for which figures are available, 2023–24, annual changes in housing supply in England amounted to 221,070 net additional homes. This was a decrease of 6% on the previous year. Since the publication of net additional homes statistics began in 1991–92, the peak year for new homes was in 2019–2020, when 248,590 new homes were built.⁷⁸

73 Written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)). See also [Q 14](#) (Liam Spender) and written evidence from Mrs R Parfitt ([BSR0018](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)) and written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)).

74 [Q 134](#) (Andy Roe)

75 [Q 134](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

76 Labour Party, *Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024*, June 2024

77 Conservative and Unionist Party, *Manifesto 2019: Get Brexit Done Unleash Britain’s Potential*, November 2019

78 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2023 to 2024*, November 2024

56. A large number of witnesses argued that delays in BSR decisions had held up the construction of new housing in high-rise buildings.⁷⁹ Matt Voyce, Executive Director of Construction at Quintain, which is developing an 85-acre estate in Wembley Park, said that his experience of the BSR had been “challenging, frustrating and costly”. He argued that the delays put an “increased ask” on investors without any certainty on the timetable or a successful outcome, which “will deter investment into housebuilding and stall projects, and potentially people will lose their jobs”.⁸⁰
57. The Construction Leadership Council’s Mark Reynolds explained that delays increase costs for developers through increased interest charges and inflation in construction prices, potentially making schemes “unviable”.⁸¹ Many other witnesses shared his strong concerns about the impact of delays on the viability of new housing in higher-risk buildings.⁸² Fairview New Homes Limited said that the delays “are threatening the continued operation” of its business as mid-rise to high-rise buildings have become “impossible to finance”.⁸³
58. Abri Group, a not-for-profit social housing provider, said that an eight-month delay to one of its regeneration projects had resulted in a £2.2 million increase

79 [Q 11](#) (Matt Voyce, Dan Hollas), [Q 38](#) (Mark Reynolds), [Q 50](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 83](#) (Lorna Stimpson, Darren Ettles), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), Comer Home Group ([BSR0006](#)), Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0027](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Mineral Products Association ([BSR0113](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Buildings ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from Finishes and Interiors Sector ([BSR0140](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)), written evidence from Ridge and Partners LLP ([BSR0142](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), and written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#))

80 [QQ 1, 3](#) (Matt Voyce)

81 [Q 39](#) (Mark Reynolds)

82 *Ibid.* See also [Q 11](#) (Matt Voyce, Dan Hollas), [Q 59](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0027](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)), written evidence from the National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Unite Group ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from the Finishes and Interiors Sector ([BSR0140](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)), written evidence from Vastint UK ([BSR0158](#)), and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#)).

83 Written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#))

in build costs due to inflation.⁸⁴ Vistry West London suggested that for a project costing £100 million to build, the current approval rates are leading to an increase of financing costs in the region of £5 million, leading to “a significant withdrawal of investors away from multi-occupancy buildings” and a substantial increase in borrowing costs for HRBs.⁸⁵ Southern Housing told us that it had “taken the decision to move away” from buildings over 18 metres.⁸⁶

59. Concerns were also raised, including by OakNorth Bank, that delays could impact on specialist supply chains involved in the construction of HRBs as a consequence of the lack of work coming forward, exacerbating existing skills shortages.⁸⁷ The British Property Federation raised concerns that redundancies are occurring in the supply chain because many schemes are stalled at Gateway 2.⁸⁸
60. Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations at the National House Building Council (NHBC), argued that “clearing up” the “blockage” at Gateway 2 was “fundamental” in delivering the Government’s target for new homes. He pointed to NHBC figures showing that new registrations in London, which has a high proportion of HRBs, were down by 48% on the previous year in 2024.⁸⁹
61. The Greater London Authority’s statistics on residential housing starts found that residential starts in London dropped from 48,745 new homes in 2022–23 to 27,543 in 2023–24. Residential starts in London fell further in 2024–25 to 21,026—just 43% of the 2022–23 figure.⁹⁰
62. Numerous other witnesses suggested that housing in HRBs would play an important role in the Government’s housebuilding target and that delays in

84 Written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)). See also written evidence from the Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from the Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from Ridge and Partners LLP ([BSR0142](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), and written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#))

85 Written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)). See also written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), and written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#))

86 Written evidence from the National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)) and written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)). See also [Q 83](#) (Darren Ettles), written evidence from Cast Consult ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Bailly Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), and written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#))

87 Written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)). See also [Q 83](#) (Lorna Stimpson), written evidence from Michael Sanders ([BSR0004](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from the Mineral Products Association ([BSR0113](#)), and written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#))

88 Written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)). See also written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), and written evidence from the Mineral Products Association ([BSR0113](#))

89 [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans)

90 Greater London Authority, [Residential starts dashboard](#)

approvals would significantly affect the chances of meeting it.⁹¹ The Home Builders Federation suggested that flats comprise “around 40% of total new housing”, requiring around 600,000 flats to be built across the country in this Parliament. In London, which has a new homes target of 440,000 over five years, the Federation argued that over 410,000 of these will “likely need to be flats”.⁹²

63. Conversely, Kent Fire and Rescue Service Services argued that high-rise buildings are “a minor consideration for housing stock” as the majority of households live in low-rise or mid-rise buildings.⁹³ The Chartered Institute of Building argued that the BSR’s building control delays would not be “the major roadblock or primary influencing factor” in new homes not being delivered in England, as most will be delivered through low-rise developments.⁹⁴ However, they suggested that delays in BSR approvals will be one of the factors preventing cities meeting their own individual targets—a point echoed by several other witnesses.⁹⁵
64. Witnesses broadly acknowledged that building control approval delays were only one factor among many impacting the delivery of new housing, with delays in planning approvals and a shortage of the necessary skills being

91 [Q 2](#) (Matt Voyce), written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Comer Home Group ([BSR0006](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Scape Living ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from the Mineral Products Association ([BSR0113](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists ([BSR0123](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)) and written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#))

92 Written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#))

93 Written evidence from Kent Fire and Rescue Service ([BSR0089](#)). See also written evidence from Salus Building Control & Fire Safety Consultants Ltd ([BSR0059](#))

94 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#))

95 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)). See also written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Paul Hadaway ([BSR0035](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow plc ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from the National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)) and written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)).

frequently raised.⁹⁶ However, several argued that, in the words of the G15 group of housing associations, the BSR's delays are "uniquely problematic because the timescales for approval are uncertain and difficult to predict", and so cannot be factored in in the same way as more familiar barriers, such as the planning system.⁹⁷

65. Chris Griffin McTiernan, the BSR's Deputy Director of Operations, said that the Government has estimated that "around 25%" of the 1.5 million homes target will be made up of HRBs, meaning that the "vast majority of house building" will happen outside the BSR's building control approvals.⁹⁸ The Building Safety Regulator's written evidence to us noted that as of 29 August 2025, live building control applications represented approximately 2.5% of the homes needed to meet the Government's target.⁹⁹
66. Griffin McTiernan said that many of the regulator's assumptions about how long it thought applications would take to determine had been "quite a bit off", including the BSR receiving a greater number of applications than anticipated and having to spend a greater number of hours on those applications than expected.¹⁰⁰ Philip White, the BSR's Chief Inspector of Buildings, said that the multi-disciplinary team (MDT) model used to determine Gateway applications was "not working" because it was taking too long to put MDTs together as their members are seconded in.¹⁰¹
67. Griffin McTiernan explained that the BSR has introduced an Innovation Unit for new-build building control applications, in which directly employed BSR staff will conduct Gateway assessments.¹⁰² This aims to put MDTs together more quickly with the aim of reducing the time taken to make decisions to 13 weeks.¹⁰³ He accepted that this fell short of the BSR's statutory timeline for making building control decisions, but stressed that the regulator is "having to be realistic".¹⁰⁴ The details of how MDTs are staffed and the introduction of the Innovation Unit are discussed further in Chapter 6.
68. Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, said that the BSR intends to clear the remaining 91 new-build applications it is managing under the "old" MDT system "by Christmas" 2025, with all incoming new-build

96 [Q 53](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 81](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from the National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from the National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from Wates Group ([BSR0122](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)) and written evidence from the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#))

97 Written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)). See also written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0086](#)), written evidence from the National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)) and written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#))

98 [Q 120](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

99 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#)). See also [Q 81](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt) and written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#))

100 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

101 [Q 111](#) (Philip White). See also [Q 127](#) (Andy Roe)

102 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

103 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan, Philip White)

104 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

applications being taken forward by the Innovation Unit.¹⁰⁵ He accepted that the delays are “simply not acceptable” and reflect that “significant parts of this operation do not work”, explaining that the BSR is “looking at every single aspect” of its operations to improve the situation.¹⁰⁶ He emphasised that “not having a house is equally dangerous” to living in an unsafe building.¹⁰⁷

69. **The tragic loss of 72 lives at the Grenfell Tower fire laid bare the urgent need to reform building safety regulation in England, particularly for high-rise buildings. The introduction of the Building Safety Regulator was a necessary and welcome step. We welcome the increased scrutiny it has brought to the design, construction and management of buildings in the interest of safety.**
70. **Nonetheless, there is an urgent need for the BSR to improve on how it delivers the task of ensuring that new and existing buildings are safe. Widespread delays in the BSR’s approval processes, such as for remediation of dangerous cladding, leave residents in unsafe buildings for longer. Leaseholders and building managers also face costly, delayed application processes for domestic renovations and safety upgrades.**
71. **We heard that delays in the BSR’s building control approvals have a severe impact on the viability of high-rise housing projects, with knock-on effects for their supply chains. Although they are only part of our housing stock, delays in approvals for high-rise buildings slow progress towards the Government’s targets for building new homes and remediating dangerous cladding.**
72. **The scale of the delays caused by the BSR has stretched far beyond the regulator’s statutory timelines for building control decisions. This is unacceptable. We welcome that the Government and the BSR are now acting to try and make practical improvements, but this will not address the anxiety and frustration that residents and companies have experienced. It does not improve safety to delay vital remediation and refurbishments, nor to deter the delivery of new housing in high-rise buildings.**
73. *The Government and the BSR’s new leadership need to pay close attention to the regulator’s performance against its statutory timelines and be proactive in making further changes if this does not improve significantly. In particular, we expect the BSR to meet the short term targets it has set itself for clearing “old” new-build applications, and to set a realistic deadline for when it will bring application timelines down to its new 13-week ambition.*

105 [Q 127](#) (Andy Roe)

106 [Q 127](#) (Andy Roe)

107 [Q 141](#) (Andy Roe)

CHAPTER 3: RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AUTHORITIES

The Building Safety Regulator's organisational status

74. The Building Safety Act 2022 gave responsibility for building safety regulation to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Great Britain's workplace health and safety regulator. HSE set up the Building Safety Regulator within its organisation.¹⁰⁸
75. In June 2025, the Government announced that it had appointed Andy Roe KFSM, previously the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, as non-executive chair of a new board of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.¹⁰⁹ The board is undertaking preparatory work for the establishment of a new Executive Agency of the Ministry, which will take on the functions of the BSR from HSE.¹¹⁰ In November 2025, the Government published a draft Statutory Instrument that would establish the Building Safety Regulator as a new body outside of HSE from 27 January 2026.¹¹¹
76. Dame Judith Hackitt, whose independent review recommended the establishment of the regulatory framework now operated by the BSR, said that it was "always anticipated" that the BSR would be reviewed and that "it may move out of HSE into a different place".¹¹² She said that the move to the new Executive Agency "seems eminently sensible".¹¹³ Local Authority Building Control Chief Executive Lorna Stimpson suggested that the move would allow the Government's "policy intent" to have a "more direct impact on how the regulator works", as previously they had been "a bit far apart".¹¹⁴ Other witnesses also supported the proposed move.¹¹⁵
77. The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership's Liam Spender noted that organisational changes "create lots of issues that have to be overcome" in setting up the new body, while Southern Housing said that the move "may disrupt progress just as the BSR is starting to bed in".¹¹⁶
78. Philip White, Chief Inspector of Buildings at the Building Safety Regulator, told us that creating a new body would create "disruption" that the regulator would do its best to minimise.¹¹⁷ He said that the BSR has "relied heavily on skills and expertise from across HSE" which will have to be replicated in the new body.¹¹⁸
79. Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, argued that the move will bring a "more singular focus" to building safety. He argued that the HSE "did an amazing job" to set the BSR up but noted its "massive" regulatory

108 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 2](#)

109 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Press Release: Reforms to Building Safety Regulator to accelerate housebuilding](#), 30 June 2025

110 Written Statement, [HCWS749](#), 30 June 2025

111 [Draft Building Safety Regulator \(Establishment of New Body and Transfer of Functions etc.\) Regulations 2026](#)

112 [Q 74](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

113 *Ibid.*

114 [Q 82](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

115 [Q 57](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 82](#) (Darren Ettles), and written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#))

116 [Q 15](#) (Liam Spender) and written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)). See also [Q 15](#) (Giles Grover) and written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#))

117 [Q 125](#) (Philip White)

118 *Ibid.*

responsibilities, stressing that the new body will have its own board that can focus on “the unique and complex business of building control in a high-risk environment”. He said that the move “comes with risk” but argued that it also provides an opportunity and “momentum” to make changes.¹¹⁹

80. Samantha Dixon MP, the Minister for Building Safety, acknowledged the HSE’s “strong leadership and technical insight” but argued that the move would ensure that “there is a dedicated focus on building safety” and would “strengthen accountability directly to ... Ministers and to Parliament”. However, she stressed that the BSR’s independence is “enshrined” in the Building Safety Act and that the move “is not an indication of political interference or control”.¹²⁰ The Minister said that her officials will “work very carefully” to minimise any disruption, arguing that the change “needs to happen” and any risks need to be balanced against “the risk of not doing it”.¹²¹

Construction products regulation

81. In 2017, Dame Judith Hackitt’s Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety found that the current process for testing and certifying products for use in construction is “disjointed, confusing, unhelpful, and lacks any sort of transparency”.¹²² The Review recommended introducing a “more effective testing regime” with clearer labelling and product traceability, underpinned by a more effective national market surveillance system, which she suggested could be achieved by extending the remit of the Office for Product Safety and Standards.¹²³
82. The Office for Product Safety and Standards (OPSS), created in January 2018, sits within the Department for Business and Trade. It is the UK’s national product regulator and aims to protect “people and places from product-related harm”.¹²⁴
83. In line with the Independent Review’s suggestion, in April 2021 the OPSS took over responsibility for the regulation of construction products from local authority Trading Standards teams, with the aim of ensuring that the claimed performance of construction products is met.¹²⁵ Previously, enforcement of consumer products regulations in relation to construction had been the responsibility of local authority Trading Standards teams.¹²⁶
84. By way of example, Duncan Johnson, Deputy Director for Construction Products at the OPSS, explained that the London Fire Brigade had raised concerns that some grades of plywood were not performing to the necessary standard.¹²⁷ He said that the OPSS tested the plywood and despite it being imported from a Polish company, the regulator was able to get the importers

¹¹⁹ [Q 128](#) (Andy Roe)

¹²⁰ [Q 127](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

¹²¹ [QQ 127–128](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

¹²² Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report*, [Cm 9607](#), May 2018

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Office for Product and Safety Standards, [About us](#)

¹²⁵ Office for Product Safety and Standards, [National regulation: construction products](#), September 2024, updated July 2025

¹²⁶ Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report Overview](#), September 2024

¹²⁷ [Q 98](#) (Duncan Johnson)

to “take that product off the market and ... notify the people supplied of the true performance”.¹²⁸

85. A 2023 Independent Review of the Construction Product Testing Regime raised several issues with the Construction Products Regulations, including that “only construction products for which there is a designated standard are covered”, with anecdotal estimates suggesting that about two-thirds of construction products are unregulated due to an absence of the necessary product standards.¹²⁹
86. The Review also found that the Regulation is designed to assess conformity with product performance standards rather than safety, that the assessment process is “so complex that few people properly understand it”, and that the system for setting standards and assessing conformity with them is “overloaded and slow”.¹³⁰ The OPSS is responsible for assessing whether products on the market meet these product performance standards, but product standards are set and products are tested by other conformity assessment bodies acting as part of the UK’s National Quality Infrastructure.¹³¹
87. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 2 report, published in September 2024, argued that “one very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials was systematic dishonesty” on the part of those who had made and sold the cladding panels and insulation products used on the building.¹³² The report suggested that the arrangements for regulating the construction industry “had become too complex and fragmented” by the time of the fire, with products regulation, Building Regulations and fire safety all sitting within different departments.¹³³
88. In early 2025, the Government published a Construction Products Reform Green Paper, which proposed several changes to construction products regulation for consultation.¹³⁴ The Green Paper proposed the introduction of a “risk-based general safety requirement” for construction products that are not currently covered by designated standards or technical assessments, which would require those selling products to understand and take proportionate actions to control any safety risk connected to their intended use.¹³⁵
89. For products that are covered by designated standards, the Government proposed making the UK consistent with the revised EU Construction Products Regulation¹³⁶, which includes new obligations to provide safety and installation information.¹³⁷ For products classified as critical to safe construction, the Green Paper proposed that additional measures would

128 Q 98 (Duncan Johnson)

129 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of the Construction Product Testing Regime*, April 2023

130 *Ibid.*

131 Department for Business and Trade, *The UK’s National Quality Infrastructure*, August 2020, updated August 2025

132 Grenfell Tower Inquiry, *Phase 2 Report Overview*, September 2024

133 *Ibid.*

134 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Construction Products Reform Green Paper 2025*, February 2025

135 *Ibid.*

136 [Regulation \(EU\) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC](#). This Regulation continues to apply in the UK as assimilated law.

137 *Ibid.*

apply to support safe installation, including that all such products be covered by a national or recognised standard.¹³⁸

90. The BSR is not responsible for assessing the manufacturers of products. OPSS Chief Executive Graham Russell MBE explained the OPSS' role as making sure "that what turns up on the lorry at the building site is what it says it is", with the BSR being "responsible for whether that is properly specified, properly used and properly installed".¹³⁹ He said that it is "impossible" for the BSR to make buildings safe if the products are wrong but argued that there is "not much crossover" between the people who make products and the people who build buildings.¹⁴⁰
91. Mark Reynolds, Co-Chair of the Construction Leadership Council, said that "before Grenfell, there was a lack of understanding of the products", with "significant failures all the way through" from developers to their supply chains.¹⁴¹ He suggested that even where products had the appropriate certification they may not be compliant with regulations.¹⁴² Reynolds said that the "greatest worry for the industry at the moment is the legacy" of these products being used, which is "an even bigger challenge" than the BSR's delays in building control approvals.¹⁴³
92. Dan Hollas, Director of Building Safety at Clarion Housing Group, felt that 10% of problems with the housing association's external wall systems were to do with "the wrong product" being used, whereas 90% of problems were due to the quality of construction.¹⁴⁴
93. Ben Oram, Chair of the Architectural Technical Leads Group, said that the "single most important thing" in the Green Paper was the mandatory safety assessment for all products, suggesting that this would require manufacturers to evaluate how their products will be used and take a view on whether they can be used safely.¹⁴⁵ He argued that this is "absolutely fundamental" but it is currently only a "maybe" in the Green Paper.¹⁴⁶
94. Some witnesses suggested that how the BSR and the OPSS cooperate is, in the words of Liftworks Limited, "not always visible".¹⁴⁷ Dame Judith Hackitt argued that there is "plenty of evidence of good collaboration" between the OPSS and the BSR, but she also stressed that "the two regulatory frameworks are very different" and focus on different parts of the industry.¹⁴⁸
95. Russell emphasised the importance of the two bodies exchanging data and maintaining information flows, regardless of whether they are merged into

138 [Regulation \(EU\) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC](#). This Regulation continues to apply in the UK as assimilated law.

139 [Q 106](#) (Graham Russell MBE)

140 [Q 108](#) (Graham Russell MBE)

141 [Q 42](#) (Mark Reynolds)

142 [Q 42](#) (Mark Reynolds)

143 [Q 42](#) (Mark Reynolds)

144 [Q 10](#) (Dan Hollas)

145 [Q 62](#) (Ben Oram)

146 [Q 62](#) (Ben Oram). See also written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#))

147 Written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)). See also [Q 10](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 24](#) (Liam Spender, Giles Grover), written evidence from Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)) and written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)).

148 [Q 78](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

a single regulator.¹⁴⁹ The BSR's Chief Inspector of Buildings, Philip White, also stressed that the two regulators "work very closely" together and that "relationships are good".¹⁵⁰

96. Samantha Dixon MP, Minister for Building Safety, explained that the Government would bring forward a White Paper on construction products regulation in Spring 2026.¹⁵¹
97. **We support the Government's plans to introduce greater regulation of construction products, particularly the introduction of a generalised safety requirement for all products. This would end the current position, where only those products that are covered by existing product standards can be regulated, allowing those making and marketing them to be held accountable for their performance.**
98. *We urge the Government to move swiftly following the White Paper to ensure that all construction products are properly regulated. As part of the White Paper, the Government should confirm that it plans to introduce a generalised safety requirement for all construction products.*

The single construction regulator

99. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry's Phase 2 report recommended the establishment of a single construction regulator, reporting to a single Secretary of State, to provide a "focal point in driving a much-needed change in the culture of the construction industry".¹⁵² The Inquiry recommended that the new regulator be given responsibility for the regulation and testing of construction products and the regulation and oversight of building control, among other functions.¹⁵³
100. In its response to the Phase 2 report, the Government accepted the recommendation for a single construction regulator, although it argued that it should not undertake testing as well as regulation of construction products, suggesting that this would create a conflict of interest.¹⁵⁴ The Government indicated that it would publish a Regulatory Reform Prospectus setting out its plans for regulatory reform in autumn 2025.¹⁵⁵ In its announcement of reforms to the BSR, the Government suggested that the new body being set up to take on the functions of the BSR was "part of initial steps towards creating a single construction regulator".¹⁵⁶
101. Witnesses were broadly supportive of the proposal for a single construction regulator, with several suggesting that the current system is "fragmented"

149 [Q 106](#) (Graham Russell MBE)

150 [Q 123](#) (Philip White)

151 [Q 140](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

152 *Ibid.*

153 *Ibid.*

154 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Cabinet Office and Home Office, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report: Government response](#), June 2025

155 *Ibid.*

156 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Press Release: Reforms to Building Safety Regulator to accelerate housebuilding](#), 30 June 2025

and that a single regulator could provide a clearer and more consistent framework for the sector.¹⁵⁷

102. The Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists argued that “it is more important that these functions be delivered effectively, than that they be delivered by a single body.”¹⁵⁸ The Institute suggested that the priority should be addressing current regulatory challenges rather than merging functions.¹⁵⁹
103. Philip White said that a single construction regulator “is needed” but questioned whether now was the “right time” to establish it.¹⁶⁰ He suggested that the single regulator would require legislation which was likely to be “some time away”.¹⁶¹ As with the BSR’s move from HSE to a body within MHCLG, White argued that the organisational change would lead to “disruption”, while suggesting that the regulator would do its best to “keep business going as usual”.¹⁶²
104. Catherine Adams, Director of Building Systems and Insight at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, explained that the Government’s regulatory prospectus would include a “more detailed proposal” on the future of the single construction regulator and how this will “sit with” the changes the Government has made to the BSR.¹⁶³
105. **If implemented properly, the establishment of a single construction regulator should improve the consistency and coordination of what is currently a complex, fragmented landscape. However, this will present a second major organisational change for the BSR, a new regulator that is struggling to bed in a new framework.**
106. *We support the Government’s broad proposal to establish a single construction regulator. However, we heard concerns that organisational changes could distract from the immediate imperative of improving operational performance. The implementation of this further organisational change should wait until the BSR is delivering its building control decisions within statutory timeframes.*

Non-higher-risk buildings

107. The Building Safety Regulator is the building control authority for higher-risk buildings (HRBs) in England.¹⁶⁴ Non-higher-risk buildings can still

157 [Q 10](#) (Dan Hollas), [Q 24](#) (Giles Grover), [Q 53](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 62](#) (Ben Oram, Steve Evans), [Q 96](#) (Lorna Stimpson, Darren Ettles), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)) and written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#))

158 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists ([BSR0123](#))

159 *Ibid.*

160 [Q 125](#) (Philip White)

161 *Ibid.*

162 *Ibid.*

163 [Q 141](#) (Catherine Adams)

164 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 32](#)

make building control applications to local building control authorities or private building inspectors, provided those authorities or inspectors are registered with the BSR.¹⁶⁵

108. In addition to regulating the building control profession that oversees work in non-higher-risk buildings, the BSR has a duty to keep under review the standard of all buildings, and the safety of people in those buildings.¹⁶⁶ Philip White, Chief Inspector of Buildings at the BSR, told us that the regulator reports to Ministers on a quarterly basis on building risks in the built environment, including risks relating to existing buildings and the use of new building techniques and materials.¹⁶⁷ For instance, he indicated that the BSR had advised the Government on the risks associated with Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated Concrete (RAAC).¹⁶⁸
109. The BSR indicated that current risks in its register include the use of non-strengthened large panel systems, modern methods of construction, and the non-compliant installation of external wall insulation and other energy efficiency products.¹⁶⁹
110. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry's Phase 2 report argued that defining a building as higher-risk by reference only to its height was unsatisfactory, suggesting that the nature of a building's use and the likelihood of vulnerable people being present are "more relevant" than height.¹⁷⁰ The report recommended that the definition of a higher-risk building should be reviewed urgently.¹⁷¹ In its response to the report, the Government said that the BSR has conducted an initial review of the definition of a higher-risk building, and that plans for an ongoing review would be set out in summer 2025.¹⁷²
111. Giles Grover, Co-Lead at End Our Cladding Scandal, argued that "any building, of whatever height ... needs to be made safe", suggesting that while height is a determinant of risk, "it is not the sole factor".¹⁷³ He said that mid-rise and low-rise buildings are sometimes constructed using combustible materials and that there had been "a lot of gaming of the system", with developers constructing buildings "just below 18 metres" in height.¹⁷⁴ Gary Strong, Global Building Standards Director at the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, argued that there has been "a rigid adherence to heights" despite most fatalities and injuries occurring in buildings below 11 metres in height.¹⁷⁵

165 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 42](#)

166 Building Safety Act 2022, [section 5](#)

167 [QQ 110, 121](#) (Philip White)

168 *Ibid.* Reinforced Aerated Autoclaved Concrete (RAAC) is a type of lightweight concrete which, unlike traditional concrete, does not contain gravel and pieces of crushed stone. It was used in the UK between the 1950s and 1990s, mostly to construct public buildings, such as schools and hospitals. RAAC came to public and media attention in 2023, when the Department for Education (DfE) advised schools to close buildings with RAAC until safety work took place, just before the start of term. House of Commons Library, *RAAC in the UK: Concerns and government response*, [CBP 2024/9917](#), January 2024

169 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

170 Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report Overview](#), September 2024

171 *Ibid.*

172 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Cabinet Office and Home Office, [Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report: Government response](#), June 2025

173 [Q 23](#) (Giles Grover)

174 *Ibid.* See also [Q 23](#) (Liam Spender) and written evidence from Riskflag ([BSR0057](#)).

175 [Q 58](#) (Gary Strong). See also [Q 58](#) (Ben Oram) and written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#))

112. Rockwool Ltd argued in favour of lowering the threshold for higher-risk buildings, for instance to 11m in height.¹⁷⁶ Ben Oram, Chair of the Architectural Technical Leads Group, argued that having the two regimes separated is “asking for problems later”, given the “significant and uncontrolled risks” in buildings below the threshold.¹⁷⁷ He expressed hope that the proposed single construction regulator could help to improve practices in lower-rise buildings.¹⁷⁸
113. Others, such as the developer Knight Dragon, argued that the threshold should be raised, for instance to 30m in height, arguing that this would “allow a significant number of buildings” to progress without going through the Gateway process and would focus on buildings carrying greater risk.¹⁷⁹
114. Liam Spender, a Trustee at the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, acknowledged that there are safety issues within non-HRBs, but said that the BSR’s current regime should not be extended “because the indications are that it is not working properly”.¹⁸⁰
115. Several witnesses argued that the BSR was having a limited impact on low-rise and mid-rise buildings, or that its impact was “unclear”.¹⁸¹ Some witnesses, such as Enframe Consulting, suggested that the BSR had made some progress in “establishing a new safety culture across the industry”, but noted that this had been “heavily concentrated” on HRBs and that its influence on non-HRBs “remains limited, uneven and largely indirect”.¹⁸² Some witnesses noted a “false belief” within some in the industry that the BSR only focuses on HRBs.¹⁸³
116. Pamela Oparaocha, Assistant Commissioner for Fire Safety at the London Fire Brigade, argued that high-rise residential buildings are a priority because of the “sleeping risk”, compared to commercial buildings.¹⁸⁴ She explained that the Grenfell Tower fire happened when “people were asleep on a hot summer’s day with their windows open” and were “unable to escape the building”.¹⁸⁵ The BSR’s new Non-Executive Chair, Andy Roe, suggested that while incidents in high-rise buildings may be lower in frequency than

176 Written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#))

177 [Q 58](#) (Ben Oram)

178 [Q 58](#) (Ben Oram)

179 Written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)). See also written evidence from the Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#))

180 [Q 23](#) (Liam Spender). See also written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0170](#)) and written evidence from the Association of Building Control Approvers ([BSR0173](#))

181 Written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)). See also written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Michael Sanders ([BSR0004](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)) and written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)).

182 Written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)). See also written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from the National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)) and written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)).

183 Written evidence from the National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)). See also written evidence from Wates Group ([BSR0122](#)) and written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#))

184 [Q 35](#) (Pamela Oparaocha)

185 *Ibid.*

in low-rise buildings, “when something goes wrong... it is very high impact” because of the number of people involved.¹⁸⁶

117. Dame Judith Hackitt said that it was “always the intention that this should not just be about high-rise buildings” and that “when the capacity was there, it should move on to the next tranche of high-rise and medium-rise buildings”.¹⁸⁷ She explained that the BSR is “already looking at ... what the next extensions in scope will be”.¹⁸⁸
118. Andy Roe said that the BSR’s work on non-higher-risk buildings is “a really important part of the regulator” that may not be communicated “effectively enough” given the focus on other operational challenges. Roe said that “at some point” the BSR will want to look at other types of building. However, he argued that the BSR needs “to make this current evolution of the regime work first” before any expansion of its scope.¹⁸⁹
119. Samantha Dixon MP, Minister for Building Safety, said that the Government would publish plans for the ongoing review of the definition of higher-risk buildings, originally expected in summer 2025, by the end of 2025. She noted the “infancy of the regime”, indicating that the Government needs to “work through how this definition may change” as the BSR’s work progresses.¹⁹⁰
120. **Our witnesses were clear that height is not the only determinant of risk in buildings, but many felt that the BSR had only made a limited impact on the safety of mid- and low-rise buildings as they are not designated as higher risk. Given current performance, it would be impractical for the BSR to extend the number of buildings within its responsibility as a building control authority, potentially worsening delays in deciding applications. The BSR should instead be more proactive in communicating its monitoring of the risks faced by all buildings in the built environment.**
121. *The BSR should report annually on the most significant safety risks facing all buildings, including buildings that are outside of the scope of its building control approvals. This report should include best practice guidance on how building control professionals, developers and building managers should manage these risks.*

Regulating the building control profession

122. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 2 report found that in the period leading up to the Grenfell Tower fire, many of those involved in major construction projects “regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance”.¹⁹¹ The Inquiry said that this was “a serious misunderstanding” that was in some cases fostered by building control bodies themselves, “who preferred to co-operate with applicants to enable proposals to be approved rather than enforce the Building Regulations rigorously”.¹⁹²
123. The Inquiry’s Phase 2 report also suggested that the introduction of commercial interests and competition between local authority building

186 [Q 140](#) (Andy Roe)

187 [Q 77](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

188 *Ibid.*

189 [Q 140](#) (Andy Roe)

190 [Q 139](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

191 Grenfell Tower Inquiry, [Phase 2 Report Overview](#), September 2024

192 *Ibid.*

control and private approved inspectors introduced “a conflict of interest” in their regulatory role.¹⁹³ The report argued that this underlying conflict of interest “will continue to exist” for non-HRBs, and recommended that the Government appoint an independent panel to consider “whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process”.¹⁹⁴ The report also recommended that the panel consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.¹⁹⁵

124. In June 2025, the Government published the Terms of Reference for the Building Control Independent Panel, which is being chaired by Dame Judith Hackitt. The Panel will consider the questions recommended by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.¹⁹⁶ The Panel published its ‘problem statement’ in July 2025, echoing many of the concerns raised by the Inquiry,¹⁹⁷ followed by a call for evidence later in the same month seeking evidence to inform its recommendations.¹⁹⁸ The Panel intends to publish its review before the end of 2025.¹⁹⁹
125. England’s building control profession has been regulated by the BSR since April 2024 and consists of approximately 4,200 registered building inspectors (RBIs), 296 local authority building control bodies, and 81 private sector registered building control approvers (RBCAs).²⁰⁰
126. The BSR regulates building inspectors and approvers through its Building Inspector Competence Framework. The new Framework requires RBIs to reach a certain class of qualifications before undertaking particular building control functions. For instance, Class 1 RBIs are trainees, Class 2 RBIs can carry out most building control work on non-HRBs, and Class 3 RBIs are specialists who carry out most higher-risk building control work, including in HRBs.²⁰¹
127. The BSR can carry out inspections of building control bodies and approvers and is “on target to inspect every building control body within 5 years”.²⁰² The BSR explained that it also receives reports about professional standards, over 140 of which have met the criteria for investigation.²⁰³ Sanctions available to the regulator range from advisory and warning letters to fines and being struck off the BSR’s register.²⁰⁴
128. Some witnesses raised concerns that the introduction of regulation had led to many RBIs leaving the profession, deepening the shortage of qualified

193 Grenfell Tower Inquiry, *Phase 2 Report Overview*, September 2024

194 *Ibid.*

195 *Ibid.*

196 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Building Control Independent Panel (BCIP)—Terms of Reference*, June 2025

197 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Problem statement for the Building Control Independent Panel*, July 2025

198 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Building Control Independent Panel—informing recommendations to government*, July 2025

199 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Problem statement for the Building Control Independent Panel* July 2025

200 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

201 *Ibid.*

202 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

203 *Ibid.*

204 *Ibid.*

RBIs.²⁰⁵ For instance, Comer Home Group UK argued that the changes are “having an obvious and detrimental impact on inspector numbers, forcing many experienced and competent professionals out of the sector”.²⁰⁶ The provision of sufficient RBIs for building control functions is discussed further in Chapter 6.

129. Darren Ettles, Secretary of the Association of Building Control Approvers, argued that the reason some had left the profession was that “there were people on the ground ... who should not have been” inspecting buildings and “were not actually competent to do the job”.²⁰⁷ The BSR explained that only 72% of RBIs have demonstrated their competence, with “large numbers ... remaining in Class 1”.²⁰⁸ The BSR’s Chief Inspector of Buildings, Philip White, argued that there had been a “significant failure rate”, with 30% failing competence assessments at the first attempt.²⁰⁹
130. Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations at the National House Building Council (NHBC), explained that the NHBC had been inspected as a building control approver and 400 of its staff had been registered as RBIs, describing this as “a move in the right direction”.²¹⁰
131. Lorna Stimpson, Chief Executive of Local Authority Building Control, which represents local building control authorities, felt that the BSR providing “really detailed scrutiny” of building control bodies and inspectors would “make sure that commerciality does not come into decision-making”.²¹¹ Darren Ettles also felt that that the BSR’s audit processes mean that commercial interests cannot influence compliance, stressing that he could “end up with a criminal conviction” if he allowed this to happen in his company.²¹²
132. Dame Judith Hackitt said that the Independent Panel had so far found examples of good practice within public and private provision of building control, and examples of “where practices still need to change”, providing a “mixed” picture.²¹³ She suggested that “resource levels” were “at the heart” of a lot of the issues in the sector, noting that some in the private sector are “overseeing a staggering number of new builds all at the same time”, raising questions over how “they can possibly have oversight” of the buildings.²¹⁴
133. Gary Strong, Global Building Standards Director at the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, said that the regulation of building inspectors was “probably the biggest change” the BSR had made for non-HRBs.²¹⁵ He said that the BSR was writing to building control bodies about the types of buildings they are inspecting and that this “audit process... is a good thing, but it will take time to bed in”.²¹⁶ Chris O’Regan, a structural engineer,

205 Written evidence from Comer Home Group ([BSR0006](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)), written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#)), and written evidence from the City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#))

206 Written evidence from Comer Home Group ([BSR0006](#))

207 [Q 85](#) (Darren Ettles)

208 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

209 [Q 121](#) (Philip White)

210 [Q 61](#) (Steve Evans)

211 [Q 95](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

212 [Q 95](#) (Darren Ettles)

213 [Q 77](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

214 *Ibid.*

215 [Q 61](#) (Gary Strong)

216 *Ibid.*

suggested that initially “there was a lot of turbulence” but that “there has been a notable improvement” on the part of building control professionals.²¹⁷

134. Darren Ettles argued that the BSR needs to provide feedback to the industry on what it has found as part of its audits.²¹⁸ He suggested that the industry has heard “nothing” on “what was found, what was wrong, and what industry needs to improve on”.²¹⁹ Other witnesses, such as Scape Living plc, suggested that there is “limited evidence of effective coordination or collaboration” between the BSR and other building control bodies and inspectors, calling for greater communication and feedback in order to establish a “coherent, joined-up approach”.²²⁰
135. Philip White, Chief Inspector of Buildings at the Building Safety Regulator, said that the BSR had inspected 20% of building control approvers so far.²²¹ He accepted that it has been a “very challenging” few years for building inspectors but argued that the status of building inspectors “should be enhanced” with the introduction of regulation and qualifications.²²² He suggested that further changes resulting from the Independent Panel could also be “uncomfortable” for the profession but insisted that it would be “in a much better place in due course” as a result of regulation.²²³
136. **The BSR’s regulation of the building control profession is a positive step, ensuring that those making decisions about the safety of buildings are competent for the task and providing greater assurance that commercial interests are not leading to unduly lenient enforcement of the Building Regulations. It is nonetheless a concern that many building inspectors have chosen to leave the profession, or registered at a level that does not permit them to undertake many building control functions even in non-higher-risk buildings (non-HRBs).**
137. **As long as those undertaking construction work in non-HRBs are free to choose their building control approver, there remains some potential for competition between building control providers that could incentivise outcomes that are the expedient to the paying client. Despite this, it will be important for the Government to consider how any further changes to how building control functions are provided in non-HRBs could impact on the supply of registered building inspectors.**

217 Written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#))

218 [Q 92](#) (Darren Ettles)

219 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Salus Building Control & Fire Safety Consultants Ltd ([BSR0059](#)) and written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#))

220 Written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)). See also written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the National Federation of Roofing Contractors ([BSR0118](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)) and written evidence from the City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#))

221 [Q 120](#) (Philip White)

222 [Q 121](#) (Philip White)

223 *Ibid.*

138. *Following the report of the Building Control Independent Panel, if the Government decides to move to a national authority for building control functions, or to remove the ability of private building control approvers to provide approvals, then it must set out publicly how it intends to ensure a sufficient supply of registered building inspectors to perform these functions.*
139. **Many witnesses were positive about the impact of the BSR's regulation of the building control profession but expressed a desire for greater communication and feedback as a result of its inspections. Clearer communication from the BSR would help to spread good practice and ensure greater consistency between different building control bodies and approvers.**
140. *The BSR should report annually on the findings of its inspections of building control bodies, approvers and Registered Building Inspectors, alongside its provision of individual feedback to those being audited. This report should outline the key themes of the BSR's inspections, indicating examples of good practice and priorities for improvement.*

CHAPTER 4: ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HOUSING SECTOR

Guidance

141. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gateway 2 of the Building Safety Regulator’s approval process requires applicants to demonstrate how their proposals to build higher-risk buildings comply with the Building Regulations. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) publishes guidance on how to meet the Building Regulations in the form of the ‘Approved Documents’. The Approved Documents provide technical detail on how to comply with the Building Regulations in several areas, including structural safety, fire safety and electrical safety, among others.²²⁴
142. The Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety found that the package of the Building Regulations and Approved Documents can be “ambiguous and inconsistent”, and that they can be seen as “a set of siloed requirements” rather than considering buildings as “a single, coherent system”.²²⁵
143. In December 2024, the Government announced that there would be a review of the Approved Documents undertaken by a body known as the Fundamental Review of Building Regulations Guidance panel.²²⁶ The Government appointed members to the panel in July 2025 and its final report is expected in summer 2026.²²⁷
144. The BSR told us that 40% of Gateway 2 applications have been rejected since the establishment of the regulator in October 2023, “often because they miss basic information required by legislation”.²²⁸ The BSR also said that the introduction of the Building Safety Act did not change the functional requirements of the Building Regulations for higher-risk buildings. Instead, it established outcomes-based performance standards for buildings and building works.²²⁹
145. In July 2025, during our inquiry, the Construction Leadership Council (CLC) and the BSR jointly published further guidance for those submitting and assessing building control applications for higher-risk buildings at the Gateway 2 stage.²³⁰
146. Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, explained that the Building Regulations require an outcome and that there are “a number of different ways to get there”.²³¹ Quintain’s Matt Voyce noted that they “allow for some flexibility” and are “not prescriptive” in every instance.²³²

224 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *The Approved Documents*, last updated May 2024

225 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report*, Cm 9607, May 2018

226 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, *Membership of Fundamental Review of Building Regulations Guidance*, July 2025

227 *Ibid.*

228 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator (BSR0156)

229 *Ibid.*

230 Construction Leadership Council, *Guidance on Building Control Approval Applications for a New Higher-Risk Building—Gateway 2*, July 2025

231 Q 130 (Andy Roe)

232 Q 2 (Matt Voyce)

147. A resounding number of witnesses told us that there was a lack of clarity regarding how the BSR assesses compliance with the Building Regulations, particularly at the Gateway 2 stage, and what information applicants are required to provide to demonstrate compliance.²³³
148. Florentina Punga, a building safety strategist, noted that “the absence of standardised guidance on submission requirements causes unnecessary delays”, “confusion on how compliance pathways are to be evidenced”, and the submission of “complicated and lengthy documents”.²³⁴ She added that the Approved Documents were “helpful for baseline compliance” with technical requirements but do not “address BSR process intricacies”.²³⁵

233 [Q 3](#) (Dan Hollas), [Q 4](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 18](#) (Liam Spender), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Comer Home Group UK ([BSR0006](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0027](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from Gentoo Group ([BSR0034](#)), written evidence from Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Scape Living PLC ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Design Fire Consultants Limited ([BSR0041](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management Ltd ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Riskflag ([BSR0057](#)), written evidence from Bailly Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0060](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Fire Protection Association ([BSR0070](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from Procure Plus ([BSR0084](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Legal Executives ([BSR0086](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Kent Fire and Rescue Service ([BSR0089](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from Essential Living ([BSR0095](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from The Property Institute ([BSR0105](#)), written evidence from Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0111](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow plc ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from Royal Institute of British Architects ([BSR0137](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from Construction Skills Certification Scheme ([BSR0143](#)), written evidence from Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from Douglas Lockyer ([BSR0155](#)) written evidence from, Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#)), written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)) and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#))

234 Written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#))

235 *Ibid.*

149. Several witnesses, such as Rendall and Rittner, called for the publication of case studies of successful and unsuccessful applications to support industry learning and to provide greater consistency in applications.²³⁶
150. Gary Strong, Global Building Standards Director at the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors commented on the BSR and CLC guidance, suggesting that “two years or more after the creation of the BSR... it is long overdue to get guidance” on requirements at Gateway 2.²³⁷
151. Ben Oram, Chair of the Architectural Technical Leads Group said that any guidance “has to be thoroughly developed with industry”.²³⁸ He added that he was concerned that the regulator did not have the “in-house technical knowhow to take positions on key elements of construction”, noting that a previous failure of the BSR to clarify an issue with standards had “left a gap in the industry where we were not able to work out how big to make our staircases” for several months.²³⁹
152. Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations at the National House Building Council noted the need to ask the question of whether too much guidance could “stifle innovation and design moving forward” and that there is a balance to be struck between taking a prescriptive approach and providing the right level of support to applicants.²⁴⁰
153. Philip White, the BSR’s Chief Inspector of Buildings acknowledged that the BSR had been “behind the curve” on guidance but stressed that “it is not just for the regulator to provide all the answers”. He called for greater collaboration between the BSR, the Government and the sector.
154. Andy Roe, the new Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, acknowledged that previously “there was not sufficient guidance” for the industry or residents. He argued that the recent guidance published by the Construction Leadership Council on Gateway 2 is “of really good quality” and explained that further guidance will be published soon for Gateway 3 and the Building Assessment Certificate process. However, he acknowledged the need for better guidance and “a greater template approach” for resident management companies, who require “greater support” and can be “somewhat prey to an industry of ‘expert advice’ with associated charges”.²⁴¹
155. **We welcome that more guidance is now being provided on how applicants can demonstrate compliance with the BSR’s requirements but are disappointed that it has taken so long to be put in place. It is unreasonable to expect applicants to meet a standard when it is not clear how that standard is assessed or what a successful application would look like.**

236 Written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)). See also written evidence from Sypryan Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from The Property Institute ([BSR0105](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)) and written evidence from the National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)).

237 [Q 54](#) (Gary Strong)

238 [Q 54](#) (Ben Oram)

239 [Q 55](#) (Ben Oram)

240 [Q 56](#) (Steve Evans)

241 [QQ 127, 129, 134](#) (Andy Roe)

156. *The BSR must be clearer about how it assesses whether proposed construction projects are safe. It should continue to work with industry to clarify its requirements, including by publishing case studies and examples of successful applications where these are not already available in existing guidance.*

Communication and engagement with applicants

157. A substantial number of witnesses reported a lack of communication and engagement from the BSR and its multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), especially at the Gateway 2 stage, which they argued had slowed down the flow of information and required non-expert BSR regulatory leads to translate detailed requirements to applicants.²⁴²
158. Lorna Stimpson, Chief Executive at the Local Authority Building Control, said that the BSR had been taking a “purist” approach to handling communications, limiting contact between MDTs and applicants in order to avoid the regulator becoming too involved in the design of buildings so that it could provide robust regulatory oversight.²⁴³ Dame Judith Hackitt, Chair of the Building Control Independent Panel, told us that she was not worried about increased communication leading to regulatory capture because providing clarity and resolving issues should be part of the regulator’s core role.²⁴⁴
159. Matt Voyce, Executive Director of Construction, Quintain, told us that “communication is a failing of the BSR throughout”.²⁴⁵ However, he also noted that the behaviour of the BSR in recent months “has changed” and that his organisation “has been allowed to talk directly to the MDT, which has enabled quick information flow between our experts and the

242 [Q 2](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 4](#) Dan Hollas, [Q 54](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Michael Sanders ([BSR0004](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from Gentoo Group ([BSR0034](#)), written evidence from Paul Hadaway ([BSR0035](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Design Fire Consultants Limited ([BSR0041](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Open Society Foundation ([BSR0049](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0072](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Christopher Illsley ([BSR0077](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0111](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow plc ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)) and written evidence from City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#))

243 [Q 87](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

244 [Q 66](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

245 [Q 4](#) (Matt Voyce)

MDT”.²⁴⁶ Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations at the National House Building Council, also said that there was now greater communication between developers and MDTs, although he added that “unfortunately, our experience is that those regulatory leads have changed quite regularly, so you lose that consistency in a couple of instances”.²⁴⁷

160. We heard from witnesses that it was welcome that the BSR was offering increased pre-application communication on key design criteria—engagement which had not been widely available until 2025 and after the commencement of this inquiry—and that this was helping to improve applicants’ understanding of compliance with the Building Regulations.²⁴⁸
161. The BSR told us that it was taking a variety of steps to improve their communication channels, including recruiting account managers who will oversee the cases of developers with significant portfolios.²⁴⁹ The newly established Innovation Unit will aim to improve communication between the regulator and applicants at an early stage in order to fast-track new-build applications.²⁵⁰
162. The BSR’s Chris Griffin McTiernan said that the BSR’s initial operating model was designed to “have a buffer between the design team and the assessment team” to avoid the BSR being “seen as consultants”.²⁵¹ However, he accepted that the BSR’s communication with applicants was “not anywhere near where it needed to be”.²⁵² He stressed that the BSR has taken action, including by investing in new case officers, bringing in cross-government surge capacity and allowing the Innovation Unit to have “more proactive, voluminous communication” with applicants.²⁵³
163. The BSR’s new Chief Executive, Charlie Pugsley, explained that increased engagement had solved “many things a lot quicker”, suggesting that this “creates a learning cycle within the industry”.²⁵⁴ The BSR’s new Non-Executive Chair, Andy Roe, argued that “one meeting quite often will do the work of four weeks of correspondence”.²⁵⁵
164. **We welcome the BSR’s recent steps to allow greater levels of communication between applicants and MDTs, including pre-application conversations. While it remains important that the BSR and its MDTs do not become unduly involved in designing higher-risk buildings, high barriers to communication between applicants and**

246 [Q 1](#) (Matt Voyce)

247 [Q 55](#) (Steve Evans)

248 [Q 2](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 87](#) (Lorna Stimpson), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Buildings ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)) and written evidence from City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#))

249 [Q 114](#) (Chris Griffin-McTiernan)

250 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin-McTiernan)

251 [QQ 111, 115](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

252 *Ibid.*

253 *Ibid.*

254 [Q 129](#) (Charlie Pugsley)

255 [Q 129](#) (Andy Roe)

MDTs resulted in confusion for applicants and delays in the approval process.

165. *The BSR should offer at least one pre-application conversation to prospective building control applicants. The BSR should ensure that appropriate communication is taking place between applicants and MDTs, possibly through the account manager where relevant.*

Consistency between multidisciplinary teams

166. Many witnesses raised concerns that MDTs working on similar buildings and applications make different decisions and provide inconsistent advice on whether a project should be approved or what evidence was needed to demonstrate safety.²⁵⁶
167. Dame Judith Hackitt suggested that discrepancies in decisions made by different MDTs could potentially be explained by differences in the intended occupants of the buildings.²⁵⁷ Unite Students said that the inconsistency stemmed from MDTs not communicating with each other and having varying practices in different geographical regions.²⁵⁸
168. Ben Oram told us that the BSR should play a greater role in ensuring consistency between MDTs by having stronger in-house expertise.²⁵⁹ He said that where there is any ambiguity and tension in guidance and processes, the BSR needed to provide a “central source of truth”.²⁶⁰
169. The BSR told us that they were aware that there had been some inconsistent approaches taken by MDTs and that they have asked industry bodies such as the CLC to identify specific examples and to work with them to address this issue.²⁶¹ The regulator noted that it will be bringing more expertise in-house.²⁶² The BSR’s Philip White also said that this inconsistency was a result of the regulator being in its “infancy”.²⁶³
170. The BSR’s new Non-Executive Chair Andy Roe stressed that many inconsistencies are caused by “professional difference of opinion” between different MDTs, given that the Building Regulations allow different answers to get to the same outcome. He suggested that there is a need for “a better

256 [Q17](#) (Giles Grover), [Q 54](#) (Ben Oram), [Q 58](#) Steve Evans, [Q 58](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Design Fire Consultants Limited ([BSR0041](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0072](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Fusion Group ([BSR0100](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0111](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Royal Institute of British Architects ([BSR0137](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)) and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#))

257 [Q 66](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

258 Written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#))

259 [Q 55](#) (Ben Oram)

260 *Ibid.*

261 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

262 [Q 111](#) (Philip White and Chris Griffin-McTiernan)

263 [Q 114](#) (Philip White and Chris Griffin-McTiernan)

internal route of arbitration” within the BSR, noting that the regulator is aiming to recruit credible “heads of profession” who can “take a measured approach to any complaint of inconsistency or difference of professional opinion”. Roe also explained that the BSR is recruiting account managers for larger applicants making numerous applications, who will have “a portfolio overview” and can identify inconsistencies.²⁶⁴

171. **The uncertainty faced by applicants to the BSR is deepened by receiving contradictory advice and decisions from different multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), stymying their ability to learn from previous experience. It is important that the BSR ensures that MDTs are working within a coherent and consistent framework. We welcome efforts to recruit heads of profession who should help to arbitrate and take stable positions on these points of inconsistency going forward.**
172. *The BSR should give greater guidance to its MDTs on how compliance with the Building Regulations should be evidenced and assessed to ensure greater consistency. While the use of more in-house staff should help to improve the consistency of decision-making, there is still likely to be a need for secondments in the future, and clearer expectations need to be set for how MDTs should make decisions.*

Quality of applications and culture change in the sector

173. We asked witnesses whether delays were being caused by a poor understanding of building safety on the part of developers of higher-risk buildings, leading to them submitting unsuitable applications. We received a mixed response to this question with a number of witnesses informing us that they believed that, for the most part, developers had a strong understanding of building safety and that delays in approvals were caused by resourcing and skill issues within the regulator, or from the BSR’s processes not being sufficiently clear. They reported that even large, well-regarded and experienced developers had experienced delays and rejections.²⁶⁵
174. Quintain’s Matt Voyce said that “there is no doubt in my mind that the industry is doing everything it can to be better and to learn the lessons of the Grenfell tragedy—increasing our competence, increasing our designers’ competence, making sure that we are on top of innovations in fire safety”.²⁶⁶
175. On the other hand, we also heard from witnesses who said that there are still significant sections of the industry that either had a poor understanding of building safety, or who have not yet adopted the spirit of the new regime,

264 [Q 130](#) (Andy Roe)

265 Written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Paul Hadaway ([BSR0035](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Open Society Foundation ([BSR0049](#)), written evidence from Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)) and written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#))

266 [Q 12](#) (Matt Voyce)

undertaking reactive compliance rather than proactive accountability.²⁶⁷ There were also witnesses who suggested that delays in approvals were caused both by developers' poor understanding of building safety and insufficiencies with the regulator.²⁶⁸

176. Dame Judith Hackitt noted that in comparison to other sectors such as oil and gas or aviation, the built environment industry had been slow to “step up after disasters and to change their processes and systems” and to more readily recognise the need “to be part of the solution”.²⁶⁹ She added that “it is also fair to say that it is not the case that all of the actors in that system have been laggards; there have been some good ones, but not enough by any means”.²⁷⁰
177. Dame Judith told us that her “honest view is that the regulator has not done a good job of defending itself and of presenting its case on just how poor some of these applications have been”.²⁷¹ Strikingly, Chris O'Regan, a registered building inspector, said that he had seen an application submitted to the BSR when it had been newly established where the developer had only written “it complies” as an answer to a question, with no further information or evidence provided.²⁷²
178. The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership's Liam Spender said that developers are “used to pushing risk down to their subcontractors” and that this was exacerbating cultural problems.²⁷³ The Construction Leadership Council's Mark Reynolds noted that “the tier 1 organisations are ultimately responsible”, as if the subcontractor goes out of business the main contractor will “still be writing checks”, meaning that developers are concerned about having good supply-chain partners.²⁷⁴
179. The BSR said that it “regularly” sees “applications with significant building safety issues”.²⁷⁵ The regulator added that “the proportion of applications that do not demonstrate compliance with the legal standards remain high”, arguing that “some parts of the industry appear to be struggling to discharge their new responsibilities”.²⁷⁶ The BSR argued that “incomplete applications

267 [Q 39](#) (Helen Fisher), [Q 51](#) (Ben Oram), written evidence from Shaun Williams ([BSR0010](#)), written evidence from Urban Vision Real Estate Limited ([BSR0017](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0027](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes), Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from Riskflag ([BSR0057](#)), written evidence from Irwin Mitchell ([BSR0065](#)), written evidence from National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from Chris O'Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)) and written evidence from Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#))

268 [Q 19](#) (Liam Spender), [Q 29](#) (Pamela Oparaocha), written evidence from The Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists (CIAT) ([BSR0123](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)) and written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#))

269 [Q 65](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

270 *Ibid.*

271 [Q 74](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

272 Written evidence from Chris O'Regan ([BSR0074](#))

273 [Q 19](#) (Liam Spender)

274 [Q 41](#) (Mark Reynolds)

275 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

276 *Ibid.*

take time for the BSR to assess” and put further pressure on resources, with each request for further information adding “several weeks onto the determination process”.²⁷⁷

180. The BSR’s Chris Griffin McTiernan gave several examples of the reasons the BSR has rejected applications, including “an inability to show how the building has been designed to avoid collapse”, and a common issue in which applicants’ own computer modelling shows that “smoke is being pumped into fire exits rather than being extracted”.²⁷⁸
181. The BSR’s new Non-Executive Chair, Andy Roe, said that the culture of the industry is “still an issue” but suggested that it is “far more nuanced than has perhaps been presented”. He suggested that there has been “a significant culture shift already” and that depicting developers as “the villains of the piece... is really unhelpful”.²⁷⁹
182. Roe also argued that “the system of subcontracting” in the industry “still holds great danger”, suggesting that there is “a real need” to regulate other engineering professions and critical roles in construction projects, as well as the building control profession. He suggested that “the industry itself would welcome that”.²⁸⁰
183. **While we firmly believe that the BSR must improve its processes and provide clearer guidance, the building industry must also play its part in ensuring higher standards for building safety. It does not reflect well on the construction industry that many applications are being rejected or delayed due to basic errors and an inability to evidence how they are considering elements of fire and structural safety. The time taken for the BSR to consider such applications contributes to the very delays that the industry has identified as a major concern.**

277 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

278 [Q 116](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

279 [Q 131](#) (Andy Roe)

280 [Q 131](#) (Andy Roe)

CHAPTER 5: PROCESS EFFICIENCIES

Organisation-by-organisation approvals

184. The Building Safety Act requires the Building Safety Regulator to look at applications and tackle issues for individual buildings on a case-by-case basis, which gives residents confidence that their high-rise building is being independently scrutinised by the regulator.²⁸¹
185. The BSR told us, however, that they believe that “where a dutyholder operates multiple buildings, this approach limits the opportunities for the BSR to address the weaknesses in building safety management at an organisational level”.²⁸² The regulator added that “those operating multiple buildings would be reasonably expected to have systems in place to monitor, audit and review their buildings and systems, and to respond to reports from the regulator right across their stock”.²⁸³
186. In May 2025, the BSR’s Philip White told the House of Commons Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee that he would like the regulator to have statutory powers to intervene when they find repeated issues with an organisation.²⁸⁴
187. Some witnesses called for the BSR to take a similar organisational approach to building control approvals, allowing approved organisations to bring forward new projects without submitting individual applications.²⁸⁵ For instance, OakNorth Bank said that they would support a shift to an organisation-by-organisation approach, which “could help improve consistency, reduce duplication, and enable the BSR to operate more efficiently”.²⁸⁶ They told us that they “do not believe that such a change would inherently reduce the focus on safety at the building level, so long as clear oversight mechanisms remain in place to assess individual schemes where appropriate”.²⁸⁷
188. The London Fire Brigade’s Pamela Oparaocha also supported the proposal of moving to this approach, “to create efficiency, but not efficiency at the expense of quality”.²⁸⁸ She said that this could “speed up the process” and

281 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

282 *Ibid.*

283 *Ibid.*

284 Correspondence, *Chair of the House of Commons Housing Communities and Local Government Committee to the Secretary of State and Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Local Growth*, 14 May 2025

285 [Q 6](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 6](#) (Dan Hollas), [Q 43](#) (Mark Reynolds), [Q 72](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Procure Plus ([BSR0084](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)), written evidence from Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust ([BSR0154](#)) and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#))

286 Written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#))

287 *Ibid.*

288 [QQ 30, 37](#) (Pamela Oparaocha). See also written evidence from National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)).

“if we are able to group five identical buildings built in the same time period, the issues are likely to be the same”.²⁸⁹

189. Others raised concerns about whether this proposal could work in practice, noting that this could reduce the focus on local conditions and the safety characteristics of individual buildings and that large organisations are not always consistent in their practices.²⁹⁰ The Architectural Technical Leads Group’s Ben Oram told us that he did not think “it is clear what is being proposed here” and that “the massive variety of combinations of designers and project delivery mechanisms means that it does not feel viable”.²⁹¹
190. The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership’s Liam Spender said that this approach carried risk because you would potentially be giving organisations the ability to “mark their own homework” and that the culture of reactive and minimal compliance in the sector needed to change before an organisation-by-organisation approach could be considered.²⁹² Grenfell United stressed that many of the companies involved in construction work on Grenfell Tower had “excellent reputations” and could “persuade a regulator that they were performing well as organisations, and then cut corners on individual projects once the regulator’s back was turned”.²⁹³
191. Dr Tariq Umar, Senior Lecturer in Construction Project Management at the University of the West of England said that “a hybrid model is advisable, where trusted organisations receive streamlined oversight for standard designs, while novel or high-risk projects undergo more rigorous reviews”.²⁹⁴
192. Homes England’s Helen Fisher told us that the Cladding Safety Scheme looks at both buildings and organisations, ultimately taking a building-by-building approach, but also having “an account management tier on the top, which ensures that those who are doing volumes of this are met on a regular basis and understand progress, issues and themes from their performance”.²⁹⁵
193. As noted in the previous chapter, the BSR intends to hire and recruit account managers who will be responsible for managing large developer accounts, which will lead to greater oversight of organisations.²⁹⁶

289 [Q 37](#) (Pamela Oparaocha)

290 [Q 55](#) (Steve Evans), [Q 58](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from, Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)) and written evidence from Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#))

291 [Q 58](#) (Ben Oram). See also written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)).

292 [Q 20](#) (Liam Spender)

293 Written evidence from Grenfell United ([BSR0015](#))

294 Written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)). See also written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), and written evidence from Douglas Lockyer ([BSR0155](#)).

295 [Q 43](#) (Helen Fisher)

296 [Q 114](#) (Chris Griffin-McTiernan)

194. The BSR's Chief Inspector of Buildings, Philip White, argued that currently, where the BSR finds issues at a site, it can only require improvements at that site, rather than having an "impact across the organisation".²⁹⁷ He said that his suggestion had been for a "twin-track approach", with scrutiny of additional buildings supplemented by the ability to give a notice to an entire organisation.²⁹⁸
195. On building control approvals, White explained that the BSR is required to look at each application rather than an organisation. However, he suggested that there could be a possibility of grouping together applications from an organisation to the same MDT who could "look at it in the round", giving the example of telecommunications companies applying to put new systems in multiple buildings. He said that the BSR could be "much more efficient with certain activities" but that there would be a need to "be careful how far this goes" because "it is not necessary for every brand-new building".²⁹⁹
196. The BSR's Chief Executive, Charlie Pugsley, said that while the legislation requires a building-by-building approach for building control, "on a tactical level" the regulator has been driving efficiencies by grouping "six identical blocks" of high-rise housing, for instance. The BSR's new Non-Executive Chair Andy Roe suggested that this "bundling" of applications improves efficiency without impacting building safety "at all".³⁰⁰
197. The BSR's new Non-Executive Chair, Andy Roe, said that the BSR has an interest in a more organisational approach, which could help the regulator to understand how organisations work and how they manage risk and allow it to "focus resources where there is the greatest risk". However, he argued that there is a need to be careful to avoid disadvantaging SMEs by taking a "licensing" approach to larger developers. Pugsley stressed the need to avoid any changes causing "unintended consequences".³⁰¹
198. Catherine Adams, Director of Building Systems and Insight at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, said that the current legislation provides for regulation of buildings but that the Government is keeping this "under review". She noted that the Building Safety Act 2022 requires there to be an independent review of the performance of the regime within five years of Royal Assent, which will need to be set up by April 2027.³⁰²
199. **We welcome the BSR's plans to provide account managers to applicants making significant numbers of applications, which should help to improve communication and consistency. Our evidence was divided on whether the BSR should shift to an organisation-by-organisation approach to building control approvals. We would support the increased use of the same MDTs for similar buildings built by the same organisation, which could ensure greater efficiency while still scrutinising individual buildings.**
200. *The BSR should consider how it could improve the efficiency of its allocation of MDTs. In particular, it should consider allocating*

297 [Q 117](#) (Philip White)

298 *Ibid.*

299 *Ibid.*

300 [Q 132](#) (Charlie Pugsley), [Q 133](#) (Andy Roe)

301 [Q 132](#) (Andy Roe, Charlie Pugsley)

302 [Q 132](#) (Catherine Adams)

the same MDTs to similar buildings or projects built by the same organisation, which could improve efficiency and consistency.

Staged approvals

201. ‘Design and build’ contracts, where a single contractor is responsible for the design and construction of a building, have been used commonly in the house-building sector, particularly before the establishment of the BSR.³⁰³
202. Dame Judith Hackitt explained that the design and build approach involves designing the building as it is built, creating friction with the Gateway 2 process, which expects applicants to have completed more of the design work before construction has begun.³⁰⁴ The Construction Leadership Council’s Mark Reynolds argued that the level of detail being asked for at Gateway 2 is “beyond the capability of the system the industry works in” and requires the industry to spend “a lot more money”.³⁰⁵
203. Many witnesses, including Dame Judith, said that they would support a more phased approach to the BSR’s process for approving applications.³⁰⁶ This approach is often referred to as staged approvals. Dame Judith said that with a shift to staged approvals “we might end up with a Gateway 1.5 or 2.5 process as the building is designed and built in stages”.³⁰⁷
204. In this model, key design principles would be agreed to before construction has commenced, and applicants would have more opportunities to submit details at varying stages of the process, rather than preparing everything before application.³⁰⁸ Dame Judith told us that:

“the Act and Regulations for Gateway 2 already allow staged approval or conditional approval. This flexibility has not yet been used but I believe that it should be. It would allow schemes to make a start where the basics of structure and fire safety are clearly set out, allowing further design work to continue, but always knowing that if that further work changes the design in any significant way it will require review and reapproval”.³⁰⁹
205. Local Authority Building Control’s Lorna Stimpson also supported staged approvals, advocating for a “happy medium” in which the industry is not “making it up as it went along” but the BSR is also not being too “purist” in

303 [Q 70](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

304 *Ibid.*

305 [Q 40](#) (Mark Reynolds)

306 Written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Centre for Cities ([BSR0053](#)), written evidence from Irwin Mitchell ([BSR0065](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Chris O’Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)), written evidence from Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust ([BSR0154](#)) written evidence from Vasint UK ([BSR0158](#)) written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)) and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#))

307 [Q 70](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

308 [Q 70](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

309 Written evidence from Dame Judith Hackitt ([BSR0168](#))

terms of needing to know “every detail of every screw” before construction can begin.³¹⁰

206. The Architectural Technical Leads Group’s Ben Oram explained that the current system meant that “you may be working on a remediation project of a high-rise building. You may find ground conditions that you were not expecting, or you may find something else outside your control, then you have to submit a major change application and you cannot do any of that work for six weeks”.³¹¹
207. Speaking in defence of ‘design and build’ contracts, the Association of Building Control Approvers’ Darren Ettles told us that “design and build is not necessarily a bad way of doing it if it is done well” and that this way of building could still lead to “a safe, compliant, certified building at the end”.³¹²
208. The BSR’s Philip White said that, with the newly established gateway process, the “pendulum might have swung a bit too far in relation to what is expected of industry and regulators” when it comes to expecting applicants to supply details of their plans in advance.³¹³
209. The BSR told us that it would expand the use of staged approvals in the autumn, accompanied by guidance developed with the industry. This would allow specified building work such as groundworks and foundations to commence, with applications for the remaining work provided at a later stage.³¹⁴ The regulator also said that it had already increased the rate of ‘Approved with Requirements’ decisions, which allow work to begin while non-critical design elements are resolved, arguing that alongside other changes, this had made June and July 2025 “the two most productive months for Gateway 2 applications so far”.³¹⁵
210. The BSR’s Non-Executive Chair, Andy Roe, said that what is being proposed would not allow developers to “build and change” as they went, describing the lack of appropriate change control as “one of the great failures” that led to the Grenfell Tower fire. He said that developers would still be unable to begin work on particular aspects of their construction until their design for them has been cleared. The BSR’s Chief Executive, Charlie Pugsley, said that the BSR is aiming to establish its new approach by the end of November.³¹⁶
211. **The establishment of the BSR’s gateway processes, and particularly Gateway 2, have ended the previous situation where developers could decide and change critical safety features after construction had commenced. This was entirely necessary, but we feel that initially, the BSR overcorrected for this problem and required too much detail from applicants at too early a stage.**
212. **We welcome the BSR’s decision to extend the use of staged approvals in the autumn, and to provide accompanying guidance. Implementing a more staged approach should allow significant safety elements to be settled before construction, without requiring the full design of every**

310 [Q 86](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

311 [Q 51](#) (Ben Oram)

312 [Q 86](#) (Darren Ettles)

313 [Q 118](#) (Phillip White)

314 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

315 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

316 [Q 132](#) (Andy Roe, Charlie Pugsley)

component at that stage. The BSR must strike a well-judged balance in determining what needs to be approved and when, ensuring that key safety features are designed before they are constructed.

Category B works

213. The Building Safety Act makes the BSR the building control authority for all building work, including smaller, less safety-critical building works such as domestic renovations.³¹⁷ Many witnesses told us that minor building works without serious safety implications, often referred to as ‘Category B’ works³¹⁸, should be subjected to a different approvals process to major structural and safety works, or should be dealt with by a different authority, to make the BSR’s approvals process more streamlined and proportionate.³¹⁹
214. Mrs R Parfitt, a leaseholder of an apartment in a higher-risk building, told us that “the system treats every application as if it comes from a major housing developer, regardless of scale or context”, leading to delays and significant application costs for domestic renovations submitted by individual leaseholders, even when there are no significant safety implications.³²⁰

317 [Q 132](#) (Andy Roe, Charlie Pugsley)

318 Under current building regulations, ‘Category A’ refers to works involving significant alterations to the structure, safety, or design of a higher-risk building. This type of work generally has the potential to impact the building’s overall safety and functionality, whereas ‘Category B’ is a catch-all term for all work that does not relate to structure and safety and, therefore, does not fall under ‘Category A’. Health and Safety Executive, *FAQ Explainer—Building Safety Regulator as the Building Control Authority*, November 2024

319 [Q 30](#) (Pamela Oparaocha), [Q 43](#) (Helen Fisher), [Q 53](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 90](#) (Darren Ettles), [Q 93](#) (Lorna Stimpson), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Geoff Wilkinson ([BSR0011](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Paul Hadaway ([BSR0035](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Open Society Foundation ([BSR0049](#)), written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0072](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Christopher Illsley ([BSR0077](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Procure Plus ([BSR0084](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Orbit ([BSR0090](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0111](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from The Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists (CIAT) ([BSR0123](#)), written evidence from Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Grainger PLC ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow plc ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from Unite Group PLC ([BSR0132](#)), written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from Clarion Housing Group ([BSR0135](#)), written evidence from Royal Institution of British Architects ([BSR0137](#)), written evidence from Finishes and Interiors Sector ([BSR0140](#)), written evidence from Ridge and Partners LLP ([BSR0142](#)), written evidence from Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)), written evidence from AHR Building Consultancy and Vico Homes ([BSR0152](#)), written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)), written evidence from Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust ([BSR0154](#)), written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)), written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#)), written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#))

320 Written evidence from Mrs R Parfitt ([BSR0018](#))

215. We also heard evidence from witnesses in the telecommunications sector that they were experiencing delays in installing full-fibre broadband and mobile infrastructure since the establishment of the BSR and its slow processing of applications for minor works, potentially risking digital connectivity for households living in higher-risk buildings.³²¹
216. The National House Building Council’s Steve Evans noted that more minor work such as remodelling bathrooms or changing appliances has been “tying up our most skilled and best registered building inspectors”, who are in high demand and are needed for inspections of significant structural and safety work.³²² We return to the shortage of skilled registered building inspectors in the following chapter.
217. Building design and compliance consultant Syprian Pitkin said that he was “seeing unintended consequences” due to the BSR’s responsibility for overseeing minor works.³²³ He observed that building owners and managers are “potentially delaying urgent safety work, as they wait for multiple works to be bundled into a single application or await approval” or are “are unable to carry out urgent remedial works, even under emergency provisions without first making a full BSR application”.³²⁴
218. Galliford Try Investments warned us that while “relaxing processes for elements such as smaller works may appear a proportionate approach” they would “have concerns about the interdependencies in higher-risk buildings and how a relaxation of processes for smaller works may affect overall building safety”.³²⁵
219. The BSR said that “where concerns about proportionality relate directly to the legislative framework, this is a policy matter for MHCLG and Parliament”.³²⁶ The regulator told us that they are “exploring whether Local Authority Building Control could act as BSR’s ‘agent’ for Category B work” and how they can “more efficiently support high-volume work types/sectors such as the installation of telecommunication masts”. However, the BSR explained that allowing other building control authorities to regulate building work in higher-risk buildings would require legislative change.³²⁷
220. In addition, the regulator said that they encourage industry to “bring forward Competent Person Schemes for smaller works”, where appropriate.³²⁸ A Competent Person Scheme allows “individuals and businesses in the construction industry who have demonstrated their competence to self-certify compliance with building regulations, removing the need to go through building control”.³²⁹
221. The BSR’s Non-Executive Chair Andy Roe said that now the regulator has seen its framework operating practically, there is a “good opportunity” to look at what it is proportionate for the BSR to be responsible for. He said that

321 Written evidence from the Internet Services Providers Association (ISPA UK) ([BSR0023](#)) and written evidence from the Mobile UK & Mobile Infrastructure Forum ([BSR0169](#))

322 [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans)

323 Written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#))

324 *Ibid.*

325 Written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#))

326 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

327 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0174](#))

328 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

329 *Ibid.*

there is a “pretty consistent consensus” within the BSR that a “significant proportion” of lower-risk refurbishments could be dealt with by other building control bodies.³³⁰ However, Roe stressed that the BSR would need to retain control over some refurbishments that are high-risk, noting that some of the failures in the structure of Grenfell Tower were due to “very poorly carried out remediation”.³³¹

222. The BSR’s Chief Executive Charlie Pugsley indicated that the BSR is working to provide the Government with options to “rationalise” the threshold and “bring some sense to it”.³³² Catherine Adams, Director of Building Systems and Insight at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, indicated that the Government is examining whether these options would require legislative change.³³³
223. **In a context of severe resource limitations and delays within the BSR, it strains credulity that Category B works such as bathroom renovations in higher-risk buildings are being subject to the scrutiny of the BSR’s multidisciplinary teams. This ties up scarce skilled professionals on non-safety critical applications, and subjects leaseholders to significant delays and costs. We welcome that the BSR and the Government are working to address this issue.**
224. *The Government should review what works within HRBs constitute a higher, Category A risk and should remain under the BSR’s building control supervision. The Government should then act to remove Category B works from the BSR’s building control approval processes, or at the very least allow other building control bodies to conduct this work on behalf of the BSR. If the Government decides that some Category B works should still require the BSR’s approval, it should enable the BSR to use a streamlined process for this.*

330 [Q 133](#) (Andy Roe)

331 [Q 131](#) (Andy Roe)

332 [Q 133](#) (Charlie Pugsley)

333 [Q 133](#) (Catherine Adams)

CHAPTER 6: RESOURCES AND SKILLS

Resources

225. The Building Safety Regulator charges applicants for the performance of many of its functions.³³⁴ For instance, for building control applications, applicants pay a £189 application fee, plus £151 for every hour worked on the application by BSR staff and any additional costs incurred by the BSR from other relevant authorities and third parties, for instance in the staffing of MDTs.³³⁵
226. The BSR also receives direct funding from the Government. In February 2025, the Government announced that it would provide an additional £2 million for the BSR to improve the processing of new-build applications.³³⁶ According to the Health and Safety Executive’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2023–24, the Government had budgeted to provide the HSE with £35 million in net funding for BSR functions in 2024–25. This followed net government funding of £44 million for BSR functions in 2023–24 and £22 million in 2022–23.³³⁷
227. Most witnesses told us that the BSR did not have sufficient resources to carry out its role, contributing to delays in determining applications.³³⁸ Great Places Group felt that delays in Gateway 2 approvals were “entirely caused by the resources available” to the BSR, while the Home Builders Federation argued that resource constraints play “a substantial role in the timeliness of approvals”.³³⁹

334 The Building Safety (Regulator’s Charges) Regulations 2023 ([SI 2023/965](#))

335 Building Safety Regulator, [Charging scheme 1 April 2025](#), April 2025

336 10 Downing Street, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Press Release: Government unveils plans for next generation of new towns](#), 13 February 2025

337 Health and Safety Executive, [Annual Report and Accounts 2023 to 2024](#), November 2024

338 [Q 7](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 21](#) (Liam Spender), [Q 33](#) (Pamela Oparaocha), [Q 44](#) (Mark Reynolds), [Q 59](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 92](#) (Darren Ettles), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Florentina Punga ([BSR0028](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from the Fire Protection Association ([BSR0070](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Kent Fire and Rescue Service ([BSR0089](#)), written evidence from Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from Ridge and Partners LLP ([BSR0142](#)), written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#)) and written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#))

339 Written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)) and written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#))

228. In particular, witnesses raised concerns that the BSR was left “without adequate financial resource to recruit, retain and upskill staff” to process applications, in the words of BusinessLDN.³⁴⁰
229. As part of its reforms to the BSR in June 2025, the Government announced that the BSR would recruit over 100 new members of staff.³⁴¹ At the time, the BSR had 360 employees.³⁴² The BSR told us that this recruitment drive was enabled by the Government providing “significant new funding for the BSR”, including “long-term investment”.³⁴³
230. The provision of additional public funding to support the BSR’s recruitment of staff was welcomed by many witnesses.³⁴⁴ Vistry West London, however, felt that financial investment is “not sufficient to resolve the issue”.³⁴⁵ Siderise Group argued against “throwing money into this and expecting instant results” due to ongoing skills shortages in the sector.³⁴⁶ These shortages are discussed in the following section of this chapter.
231. Some witnesses indicated that new-build building control applicants would be willing “to pay more money” in fees to get applications through at greater speed, arguing that having applications delayed “costs more”, as we heard from the Construction Leadership Council’s Mark Reynolds.³⁴⁷
232. Even those who believed that the sector would be willing to accept increased fees suggested that this would “depend on demonstrable improvements in service levels”, as argued by Liftworks Limited, who said that without

340 Written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)). See also [Q 59](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Ashton Fire Limited ([BSR0038](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)) and written evidence from Sheffield Property Association ([BSR0148](#)).

341 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [Press Release: Reforms to Building Safety Regulator to accelerate housebuilding](#), 30 June 2025

342 Written Answer, [HL8301](#), Session 2024–26

343 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

344 Written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)), and written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#))

345 Written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#))

346 Written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)). See also written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#))

347 [Q 44](#) (Mark Reynolds). See also [Q 7](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 59](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Scape Living ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#))

improvements, increased fees would “be seen as an unjustified cost increase rather than an investment in better safety outcomes”.³⁴⁸

233. Other witnesses, such as Notting Hill Genesis, argued that any fee increase would be “concerning” given current challenges to the financial viability of new higher-risk buildings.³⁴⁹ They suggested that it is “not clear” whether any fee increase would improve the BSR’s performance, given the multiple factors that have led to delays.³⁵⁰
234. For buildings that are already occupied, the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership’s Liam Spender told us that the costs of BSR functions “fall on the leaseholders”.³⁵¹ He said that an estate of 436 flats had spent “the better part of £75,000” in one year for the costs of complying with BSR requirements for safety cases and fire door checks, amounting to hundreds of pounds for each leaseholder.³⁵² Rendall and Rittner, a managing agent, said that “any fee increase would ultimately be borne by leaseholders”.³⁵³
235. Thomson Brothers, a contractor that renovates existing HRBs, argued that the cost of building control application fees for works to existing buildings is a “tremendous cost to applicants”, with the average Gateway 2 application to existing buildings costing £6,001.³⁵⁴ The company stressed that the hourly rate is the same “regardless of whether it is a corporation building a new block of flats or a resident installing an additional WC in their bathroom”.³⁵⁵ Describing their own experience, leaseholders Christopher Illsley and

348 Written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)). See also [Q 7](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 44](#) (Mark Reynolds), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Scape Living ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from the Home Builders Federation ([BSR0045](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from Legal & General ([BSR0101](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0110](#)), written evidence by AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology and the Society of Façade Engineering ([BSR0126](#)), written evidence from Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from the National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Vastint UK ([BSR0158](#)), and written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#)).

349 Written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)). See also written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Galliford Try Investments ([BSR0063](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Grainger plc ([BSR0129](#)), written evidence from the London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)), written evidence from the National Housing Federation ([BSR0145](#)), written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers ([BSR0161](#)) and written evidence from Get Living ([BSR0164](#)).

350 Written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)). See also written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)) and written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)).

351 [Q 15](#) (Liam Spender)

352 *Ibid.* See also [Q 15](#) (Giles Grover), [Q 75](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), written evidence from Mrs R Parfitt ([BSR0018](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from Principle Estate Management ([BSR0036](#)), written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0037](#)) written evidence from Neil Walton ([BSR0056](#)), written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#)), and written evidence from Christopher Illsley ([BSR0077](#)).

353 Written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#))

354 Written evidence from Thomson Brothers ([BSR0062](#))

355 *Ibid.*

Timothy Reynard argued that the BSR's charging model is "inappropriate for private homeowners", producing charges that are "disproportionate and impossible to anticipate" even for the "most minor residential works".³⁵⁶

236. Dame Judith Hackitt argued that it should be "for industry to pay the cost" for regulatory fees.³⁵⁷ She argued that it is "grossly unfair" for these costs to be passed onto residents, who have been "hit with bills for the remediation of buildings when the problem was not their fault".³⁵⁸
237. The BSR explained that it "has faced resourcing challenges at times", arguing that it has received more applications than it had forecast and has had to provide more BSR staff time for applications than expected.³⁵⁹
238. The BSR's Chief Inspector of Buildings, Philip White, emphasised that the BSR is bound by Treasury rules on cost recovery and argued against developers "paying a premium" for a better service, suggesting that this could lead to "a two-tier system".³⁶⁰ He expressed sympathy with leaseholders facing regulatory costs but stressed that "the legislation is basically equal on all"³⁶¹ and would have to be re-examined if different charging arrangements were to be introduced.³⁶²
239. White suggested that many in-occupation costs relating to registration and safety cases will "effectively be a one-off", with further assessment "once every five years, at the minimum".³⁶³ He argued that "these initial costs reflect that in some cases "the building has never been looked at structurally before", with the resultant checks being "painful financially but your building is safer and that should set you up".³⁶⁴
240. Andy Roe, the Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, explained that the BSR is working with the Government to look at what "initial investment" might be needed to make changes. He indicated his view that the issues faced by the regulator relate less to the cost recovery model and more with the availability of skilled staff nationally.³⁶⁵
241. Samantha Dixon MP, the Minister for Building Safety, suggested that efficiencies would emerge as the BSR's functions move to a new body and as structural challenges become "more apparent".³⁶⁶
242. Catherine Adams, Director of Building Systems and Insight at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, argued that the focus is on "ensuring the effective and efficient processing of all applications" rather than creating a class of applications that get special treatment. She suggested that HM Treasury's Managing Public Money guidance allows public bodies to recover costs but not to offer premium services without further legislative means to do so. She argued that making BSR processes more proportionate,

³⁵⁶ Written evidence from Christopher Illsley ([BSR0078](#))

³⁵⁷ [Q 75](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt)

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.* See also [Q 21](#) (Giles Grover)

³⁵⁹ Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

³⁶⁰ [Q 119](#) (Philip White)

³⁶¹ The Building Safety (Regulator's Charges) Regulations 2023 ([SI 2023/965](#))

³⁶² [Q 119](#) (Philip White)

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ [Q 134](#) (Andy Roe)

³⁶⁶ [Q 134](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

particularly for leaseholders in existing buildings, should lead to reduced charges.³⁶⁷

243. **It is widely accepted that the BSR has not had sufficient resources to deal with the demands placed on it, meaning that it has not been able to recruit sufficient staff to promptly process applications. Increasing the BSR's resources could increase its capacity to decide applications more quickly, although this would depend on it being able to recruit the necessary staff. It is welcome that the Government has provided additional public funding to the BSR, but it remains to be seen as to whether this additional investment will be sufficient to improve its performance.**
244. **In addition to public funding, the BSR charges fees to those it regulates to recover its costs. These costs are paid by developers for new-build housing in HRBs, and by accountable persons and leaseholders for buildings that are already occupied. Increasing these fees and charges could provide another way to improve the resourcing of the BSR. Some developers told us that they would be willing to accept an increase in regulatory fees in exchange for a better service from the BSR. However, leaseholders complained that they are already facing significant regulatory costs to examine and resolve safety issues that they bear little or no responsibility for.**
245. *The Government should explore whether it should allow the BSR to introduce separate charging schemes for new buildings and buildings that are in occupation. If further fee increases should prove to be necessary, this would provide the BSR with the ability to increase fees for developers without unduly impacting leaseholders.*
246. *The BSR should only increase its regulatory fees if it can demonstrate that this will improve performance. Any proposal to increase fees should clearly state the level of performance that the BSR believes the increase would enable.*

Skills

247. The BSR's process for building control approvals involves "rigorous assessment by a Multi-Disciplinary Team" (MDT), which typically includes a registered building inspector (RBI), a fire safety professional, and other expert staff, such as structural engineers.³⁶⁸ The BSR explained that it "depends on collaboration from regulatory partners and others" to assemble MDTs.³⁶⁹ For instance, MDTs often involve fire safety inspectors or fire engineers, who are drawn from Fire and Rescue Services (FRS).³⁷⁰
248. The BSR argued that assembling MDTs "has taken considerably longer than originally expected", taking on average five to six weeks to convene for the first time and begin contributing to a case.³⁷¹ The regulator suggested that this makes it "extremely difficult" to meet the statutory timelines of eight weeks for work to existing HRBs, and twelve weeks for applications to new-

367 [Q 134](#) (Catherine Adams)

368 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

369 *Ibid.*

370 *Ibid.*

371 *Ibid.*

build HRBs.³⁷² Many witnesses reported that the time taken to form MDTs had delayed building control applications.³⁷³

249. Ben Oram, Chair of the Architectural Technical Leads Group, raised concerns that the BSR may not have “enough in-house technical knowhow to take positions on key elements of construction”, explaining his experience that the BSR’s regulatory leads, who form part of MDTs, “do not seem to have construction experience”.³⁷⁴ Gary Strong, Global Building Standards Director at the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, argued that the BSR needs to have the right specialists to deal with specific technical issues, such as external wall systems and cladding.³⁷⁵ He called for the BSR to establish a “specialist team” to look at applications relating to cladding.³⁷⁶
250. Several witnesses argued that the BSR may struggle to recruit staff with technical expertise “because it can pay only at public sector rates”, whereas these professionals “can earn more in the private sector”, as reported by the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership’s Liam Spender.³⁷⁷ Pamela Oparaocha, Assistant Commissioner for Fire Safety at the London Fire Brigade (LFB), said that the LFB is paying a market rate supplement to its fire engineers and inspectors “just to try to compete with the salaries that are paid out there”, and that these experiences “are probably mirrored” in the BSR.³⁷⁸

372 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

373 [Q 8](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 9](#) (Dan Hollas), [Q 40](#) (Mark Reynolds), written evidence from Solaris Real Estate Limited ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Cast Consult Limited ([BSR0012](#)), written evidence from Gentoo Group ([BSR0034](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from Knight Dragon ([BSR0087](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Martyn Jones ([BSR0097](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from Barratt Redrow ([BSR0131](#)), written evidence from the National House Building Council ([BSR0133](#)), written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Structural Engineers ([BSR0144](#)), written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)), written evidence from the City of London Corporation ([BSR0165](#)), written evidence from Graystar ([BSR0167](#)), and written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#))

374 [QQ 55, 58](#) (Ben Oram). See also written evidence from Solaris Real Estate ([BSR0001](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Fairview New Homes Limited ([BSR0054](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Southern Housing ([BSR0085](#)), written evidence from the London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)) and written evidence from Aitch Group ([BSR0171](#)).

375 [Q 53](#) (Gary Strong)

376 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)) and written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)).

377 [Q 22](#) (Liam Spender). See also [Q 7](#) (Dan Hollas), [Q 8](#) (Matt Voyce), [Q 55](#) (Gary Strong), [Q 76](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), [Q 85](#) (Darren Ettles), written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)), written evidence from Notting Hill Genesis ([BSR0044](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from the National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from Great Places Group ([BSR0093](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from AtkinsRéalis ([BSR0119](#)), written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)), written evidence from the London Borough of Lambeth ([BSR0134](#)) and written evidence from Build UK ([BSR0151](#))

378 [Q 33](#) (Pamela Oparaocha)

251. RICS' Gary Strong called for "an adjustment of salaries to attract more people" into building control, including in local authorities.³⁷⁹ Local Authority Building Control Chief Executive Lorna Stimpson explained that local authorities are limited by rules that set wages.³⁸⁰ She called for building control staff to be removed from those rules, "so that local authorities are able to pay building inspectors what they need ... to retain them", as "salaries in the private sector are double".³⁸¹
252. Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations at the National House Building Council, explained that most work in HRBs has been undertaken by RBIs who are registered at Class 3H, of which there are less than 400.³⁸² He explained that between 1,000 and 1,500 RBIs have left the industry or taken on the lowest classification, Class 1.³⁸³ RICS' Gary Strong suggested that these departures have made skills shortages "a massive issue".³⁸⁴ Local Authority Building Control Chief Executive Lorna Stimpson said that building inspectors are "a very ageing community" because of a lack of investment.³⁸⁵
253. Despite this shortage of supply, Evans explained that until recently, some of these RBIs were working on smaller, less safety-critical Category B work such as "remodelling a bathroom, removing a wall" or changing appliances.³⁸⁶ The BSR explained that it has recently begun to allow Class 2 RBIs to conduct Category B work, as well as Category A work within an individual HRB, to increase RBI capacity,³⁸⁷ which Evans welcomed.³⁸⁸
254. The National Fire Chiefs Council explained that there are "fewer than 30 fully competent fire safety engineers" in Fire and Rescue Services in England who are "able to work on fire safety in complex regulated premises".³⁸⁹ They explained that this was partially due to "many moving to the private sector" in recent years.³⁹⁰

379 [Q 60](#) (Gary Strong). See also written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Scape Living plc ([BSR0040](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from Prospect ([BSR0109](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)) and written evidence from Arcadis ([BSR0149](#)).

380 [Q 84](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

381 *Ibid.*

382 [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans)

383 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from Baily Garner ([BSR0058](#)) and written evidence from Olympian Homes ([BSR0153](#)).

384 [Q 53](#) (Gary Strong). See also [Q 76](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt), written evidence from OakNorth ([BSR0073](#)), written evidence from Chris O'Regan ([BSR0074](#)), written evidence from Abri Group ([BSR0075](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from P Casey and Co Ltd ([BSR0088](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)) and written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)).

385 [Q 84](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

386 [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans)

387 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

388 [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans). See also written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)) and written evidence from G15 ([BSR0121](#)).

389 Written evidence from the National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#))

390 *Ibid.* See also written evidence from Hoare Lee ([BSR0039](#)).

255. The BSR explained that in August, it had launched a Fast Track Innovation Unit to accelerate the determination of building control applications, which will initially work on new-build HRBs, before taking on responsibility for remediation applications “within months”.³⁹¹ The Unit will involve “the direct recruitment” of RBIs, fire engineers and structural engineers into the BSR, with the aim of overcoming the challenge of assembling MDTs.³⁹²
256. Many witnesses supported the BSR employing more MDT staff in-house, arguing that it would save time and improve the internal expertise of the regulator.³⁹³ Dame Judith Hackitt suggested that having staff in-house “leads to greater consistency and builds the body of knowledge” that a competent regulator needs.³⁹⁴
257. Other witnesses raised concern that the BSR directly employing MDT staff in shortage occupations could negatively impact other bodies who require those skills.³⁹⁵ Helen Fisher, Director of the Cladding Safety Scheme at Homes England, emphasised that the BSR’s regulation only applies to high-rise buildings, raising the possibility that direct recruitment could “strip one part of the market and industry”, of supply for building control sign-offs under 18 metres.³⁹⁶ Lorna Stimpson, Chief Executive of Local Authority Building Control, argued that the profession is already “hugely under-resourced” and questioned who would deal with “dangerous structures in local authorities” if this expertise was lost to the BSR.³⁹⁷ Darren Ettles, Secretary of the Association of Building Control Approvers, argued that if RBIs are recruited into the BSR to focus only on HRBs, it would create “a very insular model”, denying external RBIs the ability to work on HRBs and limiting the ability of the BSR’s RBIs to maintain their experience of all building types.³⁹⁸
258. Homes England’s Helen Fisher argued in favour of greater sharing of resources across the sector, explaining that Homes England has set up

391 Written evidence from the Building Safety Regulator ([BSR0156](#))

392 *Ibid.*

393 [Q 10](#) (Matt Voyce), written evidence from Syprian Pitkin ([BSR0007](#)), written evidence from Housing Forum ([BSR0061](#)), written evidence from Irwin Mitchell ([BSR0065](#)), written evidence from Bernard Taylor Partnership ([BSR0067](#)), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)), written evidence from Rockwool Ltd ([BSR0081](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Housing ([BSR0092](#)), written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)), written evidence from the British Property Federation ([BSR0102](#)), written evidence from BusinessLDN ([BSR0104](#)), written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Building ([BSR0117](#)), written evidence from Wates Group ([BSR0122](#)), written evidence from Earls Court Development Company ([BSR0128](#)), written evidence from Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing ([BSR0130](#)) and written evidence from FBM Architects ([BSR0139](#))

394 [Q 76](#) (Dame Judith Hackitt). See also [Q 58](#) (Gary Strong), written evidence from Unite Students ([BSR0078](#)), written evidence from Pareto Projects Limited ([BSR0080](#)) and written evidence from the Association for Rental Living ([BSR0096](#)).

395 [Q 21](#) (Giles Grover), [Q 45](#) (Helen Fisher), [Q 53](#) (Steve Evans), written evidence from Peter Shattock ([BSR0016](#)), written evidence from Warwick Drive (Barnes) Management Company Limited ([BSR0031](#)), written evidence from HomeGround Management ([BSR0048](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from the National Fire Chiefs Council ([BSR0066](#)), written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)) and written evidence from Anonymous ([BSR0147](#))

396 [Q 45](#) (Helen Fisher)

397 [QQ 92–93](#) (Lorna Stimpson)

398 [QQ 91–93](#) (Darren Ettles)

frameworks to help the BSR, the sector and Fire and Rescue Services to provide fire risk appraisals.³⁹⁹

259. Gary Strong expressed disappointment that the Government had announced more skills support to recruit more planning officers but had been “completely silent” around the need for more building inspectors.⁴⁰⁰ He called for “central government funding” to support more people to train as building inspectors, for instance through funding apprenticeship schemes.⁴⁰¹
260. Chief Inspector of Buildings Philip White said that there are “not enough” RBIs for the BSR to recruit, stressing that the BSR has been in contact with the Government about increasing capacity but noting that “it takes time” for policy to have an impact.⁴⁰²
261. The BSR’s Chris Griffin McTiernan said that the MDT model has been “a hugely significant challenge”.⁴⁰³ He explained that the BSR took a decision in the summer of 2024 to “recruit significantly more staff” and after “a long lead-in period”, the BSR’s output has moved from 50 building control decisions per month last year to 209 per month in August 2025.⁴⁰⁴ He also said that the BSR aims to reduce the time taken to determine applications to 13 weeks, in part by removing the time needed to recruit MDT members.⁴⁰⁵
262. Andy Roe, the Non-Executive Chair of the BSR, said that the regulator is aware that it needs “to bring more capacity to bear in the remediation space” but argued that it cannot “simply replicate another centralised model or unit” for remediation. He explained that for remediation applications, the BSR has started to “batch up bundles of 20 to 40 applications” and contract them out to large engineering firms in a “tightly managed way”. Roe stressed that it is “too early... to see whether that will massively increase” the processing of remediation applications.⁴⁰⁶ He said that the BSR had gone for a “more commercial arrangement” with engineering firms after realising that there is “very little opportunity” to second in RBIs from local authorities, who are “in a very difficult position with their staffing”.⁴⁰⁷
263. Charlie Pugsley, the Chief Executive of the BSR, explained that the BSR currently has the equivalent of nine full-time RBIs recruited directly and aims to get to 27.⁴⁰⁸ Roe suggested that this was not a “huge” number of people and argued that the current delays are “significant enough” for them to be required within the BSR.⁴⁰⁹

399 [Q 45](#) (Helen Fisher). See also [Q 44](#) (Mark Reynolds), written evidence from Liftworks Limited ([BSR0005](#)), written evidence from Dr Tariq Umar ([BSR0022](#)), written evidence from Siderise Group ([BSR0043](#)), written evidence from Ross Gissane ([BSR0047](#)), written evidence from Rendall and Rittner ([BSR0064](#)), written evidence from Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd ([BSR0068](#)), written evidence from Vistry West London ([BSR0071](#)), written evidence from Enframe Consulting ([BSR0098](#)), written evidence from the Insulation Manufacturers Association ([BSR0099](#)), written evidence from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health ([BSR0107](#)), written evidence from the Building Engineering Services Association ([BSR0125](#)) and written evidence from Local Authority Building Control ([BSR0141](#)).

400 *Ibid.*

401 *Ibid.*

402 [QQ 119–120](#) (Philip White)

403 [Q 111](#) (Chris Griffin McTiernan)

404 *Ibid.*

405 *Ibid.*

406 [QQ 127, Q 141](#) (Andy Roe)

407 [Q 137](#) (Andy Roe)

408 [Q 135](#) (Charlie Pugsley)

409 [Q 135](#) (Andy Roe)

264. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government acknowledged the “challenge” with the wider capacity of RBIs, explaining that it had provided £16.6m to support the recruitment of RBIs to backfill those supporting the BSR and would “continue to look at options to grow the overall sector”.⁴¹⁰
265. Samantha Dixon MP, Minister for Building Safety, said that the Government aims to take a “strategic and long-term approach to workforce development” as part of a forthcoming Construction Skills Action Plan.⁴¹¹ She suggested that investment in skills for the sector is “overdue” and that the Government will bring forward proposals to “build these professions” in the coming months.⁴¹² Roe suggested that the sector has known this is an issue for some time, but that “this is the first time” that he had seen conversations happening “at a national level with industry”.⁴¹³
266. The Minister suggested that increasing the pay that the BSR and local authorities could offer to RBIs “runs the risk of destabilising the wider sector”.⁴¹⁴ Pugsley argued that if regulators enter “a pure bidding war”, they “will always lose”, warning against the creation of “artificial inflation”.⁴¹⁵
267. Roe suggested that the BSR needs to “find other ways” to recruit and retain staff, including accepting that they provide “more of a training space” and play a bigger role at the beginning of inspectors’ careers.⁴¹⁶ He also suggested that RBIs, in order to maintain their status and competency, could do “some element of work in the public realm,” and potentially within the BSR. However, he suggested the need to be careful in introducing any such requirement to avoid unintended consequences, including disincentivising joining the profession.⁴¹⁷
268. **The BSR has been hampered in its ability to provide timely approvals by its struggle to recruit skilled staff to form its multidisciplinary teams (MDTs). This is partly due to the BSR’s reliance on seconding staff in from other organisations for its MDTs, which has increased the time that each application takes. However, it is also a reflection of shortages in skilled staff across the sector, particularly in relation to registered building inspectors (RBIs).**
269. **The BSR’s plans to recruit greater in-house capacity are welcome. This should boost the regulator’s technical resources and reduce the time taken to establish MDTs. However, witnesses were concerned that this could reduce the capacity of other organisations to assess the safety of low and mid-rise buildings, given the small pool of qualified professionals. Concentrating this scarce resource into the BSR could inadvertently worsen progress towards the Government’s new homes target by limiting the numbers of staff working on low-rise and mid-rise buildings.**

410 Written evidence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government ([BSR0138](#))

411 [Q 135](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

412 [Q 136](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

413 [Q 136](#) (Andy Roe)

414 [Q 136](#) (Samantha Dixon MP)

415 [Q 136](#) (Charlie Pugsley)

416 [Q 138](#) (Andy Roe)

417 [Q 136](#) (Andy Roe)

270. We welcome that the BSR has recognised this potential impact, particularly on local authorities, and is now contracting external capacity from engineering firms to progress remediation applications.
271. *The BSR must provide clear guidance on its expectations to the engineering firms it is contracting remediation applications out to, in order to provide greater consistency in MDT outcomes.*
272. Difficulties in local authority funding and the introduction of regulation have left an ageing workforce of building inspectors who are struggling to meet demand. The training of skilled workers who can staff MDTs, including RBIs, structural engineers, fire engineers and fire inspectors, should be a priority for the Government's skills funding.
273. *As part of the Government's forthcoming Construction Skills Action Plan, the Government should provide long-term funding for the training of new building inspectors, fire inspectors, fire engineers and structural engineers, at least to replace those who are set to retire in the near future.*
274. Even if more building and fire safety professionals can be trained, there is no guarantee that this would improve BSR capacity due to the demand for these skills and the difference in salaries between public authorities and the private sector. We understand that the BSR does not wish to enter a bidding war and would prefer to explore alternative options to recruit and retain staff, including providing more of an early-career training offer and potentially requiring some public sector work as part of competence frameworks.
275. *The BSR should explore whether RBIs should be required to perform some public sector work as part of their ongoing certification of competence. In doing so, it should be careful not to make registering at higher classes a less desirable prospect.*

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Impacts on building safety and new construction projects

1. The tragic loss of 72 lives at the Grenfell Tower fire laid bare the urgent need to reform building safety regulation in England, particularly for high-rise buildings. The introduction of the Building Safety Regulator was a necessary and welcome step. We welcome the increased scrutiny it has brought to the design, construction and management of buildings in the interest of safety. (Paragraph 69)
2. Nonetheless, there is an urgent need for the BSR to improve on how it delivers the task of ensuring that new and existing buildings are safe. Widespread delays in the BSR's approval processes, such as for remediation of dangerous cladding, leave residents in unsafe buildings for longer. Leaseholders and building managers also face costly, delayed application processes for domestic renovations and safety upgrades. (Paragraph 70)
3. We heard that delays in the BSR's building control approvals have a severe impact on the viability of high-rise housing projects, with knock-on effects for their supply chains. Although they are only part of our housing stock, delays in approvals for high-rise buildings slow progress towards the Government's targets for building new homes and remediating dangerous cladding. (Paragraph 71)
4. The scale of the delays caused by the BSR has stretched far beyond the regulator's statutory timelines for building control decisions. This is unacceptable. We welcome that the Government and the BSR are now acting to try and make practical improvements, but this will not address the anxiety and frustration that residents and companies have experienced. It does not improve safety to delay vital remediation and refurbishments, nor to deter the delivery of new housing in high-rise buildings. (Paragraph 72)
5. *The Government and the BSR's new leadership need to pay close attention to the regulator's performance against its statutory timelines and be proactive in making further changes if this does not improve significantly. In particular, we expect the BSR to meet the short term targets it has set itself for clearing "old" new-build applications, and to set a realistic deadline for when it will bring application timelines down to its new 13-week ambition.* (Paragraph 73)

Relationships with other authorities

6. We support the Government's plans to introduce greater regulation of construction products, particularly the introduction of a generalised safety requirement for all products. This would end the current position, where only those products that are covered by existing product standards can be regulated, allowing those making and marketing them to be held accountable for their performance. (Paragraph 97)
7. *We urge the Government to move swiftly following the White Paper to ensure that all construction products are properly regulated. As part of the White Paper, the Government should confirm that it plans to introduce a generalised safety requirement for all construction products.* (Paragraph 98)
8. If implemented properly, the establishment of a single construction regulator should improve the consistency and coordination of what is currently a complex, fragmented landscape. However, this will present a second major

organisational change for the BSR, a new regulator that is struggling to bed in a new framework. (Paragraph 105)

9. *We support the Government's broad proposal to establish a single construction regulator. However, we heard concerns that organisational changes could distract from the immediate imperative of improving operational performance. The implementation of this further organisational change should wait until the BSR is delivering its building control decisions within statutory timeframes.* (Paragraph 106)
10. Our witnesses were clear that height is not the only determinant of risk in buildings, but many felt that the BSR had only made a limited impact on the safety of mid- and low-rise buildings as they are not designated as higher risk. Given current performance, it would be impractical for the BSR to extend the number of buildings within its responsibility as a building control authority, potentially worsening delays in deciding applications. The BSR should instead be more proactive in communicating its monitoring of the risks faced by all buildings in the built environment. (Paragraph 120)
11. *The BSR should report annually on the most significant safety risks facing all buildings, including buildings that are outside of the scope of its building control approvals. This report should include best practice guidance on how building control professionals, developers and building managers should manage these risks.* (Paragraph 121)
12. The BSR's regulation of the building control profession is a positive step, ensuring that those making decisions about the safety of buildings are competent for the task and providing greater assurance that commercial interests are not leading to unduly lenient enforcement of the Building Regulations. It is nonetheless a concern that many building inspectors have chosen to leave the profession, or registered at a level that does not permit them to undertake many building control functions even in non-higher-risk buildings (non-HRBs). (Paragraph 136)
13. As long as those undertaking construction work in non-HRBs are free to choose their building control approver, there remains some potential for competition between building control providers that could incentivise outcomes that are the expedient to the paying client. Despite this, it will be important for the Government to consider how any further changes to how building control functions are provided in non-HRBs could impact on the supply of registered building inspectors. (Paragraph 137)
14. *Following the report of the Building Control Independent Panel, if the Government decides to move to a national authority for building control functions, or to remove the ability of private building control approvers to provide approvals, then it must set out publicly how it intends to ensure a sufficient supply of registered building inspectors to perform these functions.* (Paragraph 138)
15. Many witnesses were positive about the impact of the BSR's regulation of the building control profession but expressed a desire for greater communication and feedback as a result of its inspections. Clearer communication from the BSR would help to spread good practice and ensure greater consistency between different building control bodies and approvers. (Paragraph 139)
16. *The BSR should report annually on the findings of its inspections of building control bodies, approvers and Registered Building Inspectors, alongside its provision*

of individual feedback to those being audited. This report should outline the key themes of the BSR's inspections, indicating examples of good practice and priorities for improvement. (Paragraph 140)

Engagement with the housing sector

17. We welcome that more guidance is now being provided on how applicants can demonstrate compliance with the BSR's requirements but are disappointed that it has taken so long to be put in place. It is unreasonable to expect applicants to meet a standard when it is not clear how that standard is assessed or what a successful application would look like. (Paragraph 155)
18. *The BSR must be clearer about how it assesses whether proposed construction projects are safe. It should continue to work with industry to clarify its requirements, including by publishing case studies and examples of successful applications where these are not already available in existing guidance. (Paragraph 156)*
19. We welcome the BSR's recent steps to allow greater levels of communication between applicants and MDTs, including pre-application conversations. While it remains important that the BSR and its MDTs do not become unduly involved in designing higher-risk buildings, high barriers to communication between applicants and MDTs resulted in confusion for applicants and delays in the approval process. (Paragraph 164)
20. *The BSR should offer at least one pre-application conversation to prospective building control applicants. The BSR should ensure that appropriate communication is taking place between applicants and MDTs, possibly through the account manager where relevant. (Paragraph 165)*
21. The uncertainty faced by applicants to the BSR is deepened by receiving contradictory advice and decisions from different multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), stymying their ability to learn from previous experience. It is important that the BSR ensures that MDTs are working within a coherent and consistent framework. We welcome efforts to recruit heads of profession who should help to arbitrate and take stable positions on these points of inconsistency going forward. (Paragraph 171)
22. *The BSR should give greater guidance to its MDTs on how compliance with the Building Regulations should be evidenced and assessed to ensure greater consistency. While the use of more in-house staff should help to improve the consistency of decision-making, there is still likely to be a need for secondments in the future, and clearer expectations need to be set for how MDTs should make decisions. (Paragraph 172)*
23. While we firmly believe that the BSR must improve its processes and provide clearer guidance, the building industry must also play its part in ensuring higher standards for building safety. It does not reflect well on the construction industry that many applications are being rejected or delayed due to basic errors and an inability to evidence how they are considering elements of fire and structural safety. The time taken for the BSR to consider such applications contributes to the very delays that the industry has identified as a major concern. (Paragraph 183)

Process efficiencies

24. We welcome the BSR's plans to provide account managers to applicants making significant numbers of applications, which should help to improve communication and consistency. Our evidence was divided on whether the

BSR should shift to an organisation-by-organisation approach to building control approvals. We would support the increased use of the same MDTs for similar buildings built by the same organisation, which could ensure greater efficiency while still scrutinising individual buildings. (Paragraph 199)

25. *The BSR should consider how it could improve the efficiency of its allocation of MDTs. In particular, it should consider allocating the same MDTs to similar buildings or projects built by the same organisation, which could improve efficiency and consistency.* (Paragraph 200)
26. The establishment of the BSR's gateway processes, and particularly Gateway 2, have ended the previous situation where developers could decide and change critical safety features after construction had commenced. This was entirely necessary, but we feel that initially, the BSR overcorrected for this problem and required too much detail from applicants at too early a stage. (Paragraph 211)
27. We welcome the BSR's decision to extend the use of staged approvals in the autumn, and to provide accompanying guidance. Implementing a more staged approach should allow significant safety elements to be settled before construction, without requiring the full design of every component at that stage. The BSR must strike a well-judged balance in determining what needs to be approved and when, ensuring that key safety features are designed before they are constructed. (Paragraph 212)
28. In a context of severe resource limitations and delays within the BSR, it strains credulity that Category B works such as bathroom renovations in higher-risk buildings are being subject to the scrutiny of the BSR's multidisciplinary teams. This ties up scarce skilled professionals on non-safety critical applications, and subjects leaseholders to significant delays and costs. We welcome that the BSR and the Government are working to address this issue. (Paragraph 223)
29. *The Government should review what works within HRBs constitute a higher, Category A risk and should remain under the BSR's building control supervision. The Government should then act to remove Category B works from the BSR's building control approval processes, or at the very least allow other building control bodies to conduct this work on behalf of the BSR. If the Government decides that some Category B works should still require the BSR's approval, it should enable the BSR to use a streamlined process for this.* (Paragraph 224)

Resources and skills

30. It is widely accepted that the BSR has not had sufficient resources to deal with the demands placed on it, meaning that it has not been able to recruit sufficient staff to promptly process applications. Increasing the BSR's resources could increase its capacity to decide applications more quickly, although this would depend on it being able to recruit the necessary staff. It is welcome that the Government has provided additional public funding to the BSR, but it remains to be seen as to whether this additional investment will be sufficient to improve its performance. (Paragraph 243)
31. In addition to public funding, the BSR charges fees to those it regulates to recover its costs. These costs are paid by developers for new-build housing in HRBs, and by accountable persons and leaseholders for buildings that are already occupied. Increasing these fees and charges could provide another

way to improve the resourcing of the BSR. Some developers told us that they would be willing to accept an increase in regulatory fees in exchange for a better service from the BSR. However, leaseholders complained that they are already facing significant regulatory costs to examine and resolve safety issues that they bear little or no responsibility for. (Paragraph 244)

32. *The Government should explore whether it should allow the BSR to introduce separate charging schemes for new buildings and buildings that are in occupation. If further fee increases should prove to be necessary, this would provide the BSR with the ability to increase fees for developers without unduly impacting leaseholders.* (Paragraph 245)
33. *The BSR should only increase its regulatory fees if it can demonstrate that this will improve performance. Any proposal to increase fees should clearly state the level of performance that the BSR believes the increase would enable.* (Paragraph 246)
34. The BSR has been hampered in its ability to provide timely approvals by its struggle to recruit skilled staff to form its multidisciplinary teams (MDTs). This is partly due to the BSR's reliance on seconding staff in from other organisations for its MDTs, which has increased the time that each application takes. However, it is also a reflection of shortages in skilled staff across the sector, particularly in relation to registered building inspectors (RBIs). (Paragraph 268)
35. The BSR's plans to recruit greater in-house capacity are welcome. This should boost the regulator's technical resources and reduce the time taken to establish MDTs. However, witnesses were concerned that this could reduce the capacity of other organisations to assess the safety of low and mid-rise buildings, given the small pool of qualified professionals. Concentrating this scarce resource into the BSR could inadvertently worsen progress towards the Government's new homes target by limiting the numbers of staff working on low-rise and mid-rise buildings. (Paragraph 269)
36. We welcome that the BSR has recognised this potential impact, particularly on local authorities, and is now contracting external capacity from engineering firms to progress remediation applications. (Paragraph 270)
37. *The BSR must provide clear guidance on its expectations to the engineering firms it is contracting remediation applications out to, in order to provide greater consistency in MDT outcomes.* (Paragraph 271)
38. Difficulties in local authority funding and the introduction of regulation have left an ageing workforce of building inspectors who are struggling to meet demand. The training of skilled workers who can staff MDTs, including RBIs, structural engineers, fire engineers and fire inspectors, should be a priority for the Government's skills funding. (Paragraph 272)
39. *As part of the Government's forthcoming Construction Skills Action Plan, the Government should provide long-term funding for the training of new building inspectors, fire inspectors, fire engineers and structural engineers, at least to replace those who are set to retire in the near future.* (Paragraph 273)
40. Even if more building and fire safety professionals can be trained, there is no guarantee that this would improve BSR capacity due to the demand for these skills and the difference in salaries between public authorities and the private sector. We understand that the BSR does not wish to enter a bidding war and would prefer to explore alternative options to recruit and retain staff,

including providing more of an early-career training offer and potentially requiring some public sector work as part of competence frameworks. (Paragraph 274)

41. *The BSR should explore whether RBIs should be required to perform some public sector work as part of their ongoing certification of competence. In doing so, it should be careful not to make registering at higher classes a less desirable prospect.* (Paragraph 275)

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members

Lord Best
 Viscount Chandos
 Baroness Drake
 Lord Gilbert of Panteg
 Baroness Harding of Wincombe
 Baroness Nichols of Selby
 Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Chair)
 Lord Teverson
 Viscount Thurso
 Viscount Trenchard
 Lord Udny-Lister
 Baroness Valentine

Declarations of interest

Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Chair)
No relevant interests declared

Lord Best
No relevant interests declared

Viscount Chandos
No relevant interests declared

Baroness Drake
No relevant interests declared

Lord Gilbert of Panteg
Member of the board of the Electoral Commission and Chair of its Audit and Risk Assurance Committee

Baroness Harding of Wincombe
Senior Steward (Chair) of the Jockey Club

Baroness Nichols of Selby
No relevant interests declared

Lord Teverson
Director, Lasting Properties Limited
Director, Wessex Development and Investments Limited
Director, Wessex Investors Limited

Viscount Thurso
No relevant interests declared

Viscount Trenchard
No relevant interests declared

Lord Udny-Lister
Non-Executive Director, Stanhope PLC
Advisor, Delancey Real Estate
Chair, BMGP Homes 1 and 2 LTD

Baroness Valentine
Director, Value and Indexed Property Income Trust plc (quoted investment trust)
Director of Place (formerly consultant on Blackpool regeneration), Business in the Community

A full list of Members' interests can be found in the Register of Lords Interests: <https://www.parliament.uk/hlregister>.

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF EVIDENCE AND COMMITTEE ACTIVITY

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in in alphabetical order.

Evidence in alphabetical order

the ABI	<u>BSR0162</u>	
Abri Group	<u>BSR0075</u>	
AHR Building Consultancy Ltd and Vico Homes	<u>BSR0152</u>	
Aitch Group	<u>BSR0171</u>	
Luis Alonso-Fernandez	<u>BSR0019</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0027</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0030</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0037</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0046</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0051</u>	
Anonymous.	<u>BSR0060</u>	
Anonymous.	<u>BSR0072</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0111</u>	
Anonymous	<u>BSR0147</u>	
Arcadis	<u>BSR0149</u>	
Architectural Technical Leads Group		(<u>QQ 50–62</u>), Ben Oram, Chair
Architecture for London Ltd and AFL Build Ltd	<u>BSR0068</u>	
Ashton Fire Limited	<u>BSR0038</u>	
Association for Rental Living	<u>BSR0096</u>	
Association of Building Control Approvers	<u>BSR0173</u>	(<u>QQ 82–96</u>) Darren Ettles, Secretary
AtkinsRéalis	<u>BSR0119</u>	
Barratt Redrow plc	<u>BSR0131</u>	
Parq Brighton	<u>BSR0083</u>	
British Property Federation	<u>BSR0102</u>	
Build UK	<u>BSR0151</u>	
Building Control Independent Panel	<u>BSR0168</u>	(<u>QQ 63–81</u>), Dame Judith Hackitt, Chair
The Building Engineering Services Association	<u>BSR0125</u>	

Building Safety Regulator	<u>BSR0156</u>	(QQ 110–125), Chris Griffin-McTiernan, Deputy Director of Operations; Philip White, Chief Inspector of Buildings
Supplementary written evidence	<u>BSR0174</u>	
Paul Bussey	<u>BSR0166</u>	
BusinessLDN	<u>BSR0104</u>	
P Casey and Co Ltd.	<u>BSR0088</u>	
Cast Consult Limited.	<u>BSR0012</u>	
Centre for Cities	<u>BSR0053</u>	
Centre for Window and Cladding Technology (CWCT) and the Society of Façade	<u>BSR0126</u>	
The Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists (CIAT)	<u>BSR0123</u>	
The Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB)	<u>BSR0117</u>	
The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE)	<u>BSR161</u>	
Chartered Institute of Housing	<u>BSR0092</u>	
The Chartered Institute of Legal Executives (CILEX)	<u>BSR0086</u>	
City of London Corporation	<u>BSR0165</u>	
Clarion Housing Group	<u>BSR0135</u>	(QQ 1–13), Dan Hollas, Director, Building Safety
Comer Homes Group UK	<u>BSR0006</u>	
Construction Leadership Council		(QQ 38–49), Mark Reynolds, Co-Chair
Construction Skills Certification Scheme	<u>BSR0143</u>	
Steven Cooper.	<u>BSR0013</u>	
The Crescent and the Villa leaseholders association	<u>BSR0042</u>	
Design Fire Consultants Limited	<u>BSR0041</u>	
Digital Connectivity Forum	<u>BSR0159</u>	
Knight Dragon	<u>BSR0087</u>	
Martin Donkin	<u>BSR0008</u>	

The Earls Court Development Company (ECDC)	<u>BSR0128</u>	
End Our Cladding Scandal		(<u>QQ 14–25</u>), Giles Grover, Co-Lead
Enframe Consulting	<u>BSR0098</u>	
Essential Living	<u>BSR0095</u>	
Fairview New Homes Limited	<u>BSR0054</u>	
FBM Architects	<u>BSR0139</u>	
Fire Protection Association	<u>BSR0070</u>	
Finishes and Interiors Sector	<u>BSR0140</u>	
Fusion Group	<u>BSR0100</u>	
Galliford Try Investments	<u>BSR0063</u>	
Baily Garner	<u>BSR0058</u>	
Gentoo-Group	<u>BSR0034</u>	
G15	<u>BSR0121</u>	
Ross Gissane	<u>BSR0047</u>	
Grainger PLC	<u>BSR0129</u>	
Get living	<u>BSR0164</u>	
Great Places Group	<u>BSR0093</u>	
Grenfell United	<u>BSR0015</u>	
Greystar	<u>BSR0167</u>	
Paul-Hadaway.	<u>BSR0035</u>	
Chris Holland	<u>BSR0157</u>	
Home Builders Federation	<u>BSR0045</u>	
Homeground Management Ltd	<u>BSR0048</u>	
Homes England		(<u>QQ 38–49</u>), Helen Fisher, Director, Cladding Safety Scheme
Housing Forum	<u>BSR0061</u>	
Chris Howell	<u>BSR0150</u>	
Christopher Illsley	<u>BSR0077</u>	
Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH)	<u>BSR0107</u>	
Institution of Structural Engineers	<u>BSR0144</u>	
Insulation Manufacturers Association (IMA)	<u>BSR0099</u>	
Internet Service Providers Association-ISPA	<u>BSR0023</u>	

Sir Bernard Jenkin MP	<u>BSR0163</u>	
Martyn Jones	<u>BSR0097</u>	
Kent Fire and Rescue Services	<u>BSR0089</u>	
Hoare Lea	<u>BSR0039</u>	
Leasehold Knowledge Partnership		(<u>QQ 14–25</u> , Liam Spender, Trustee)
Legal & General Group	<u>BSR0101</u>	
Liftworks Ltd	<u>BSR0005</u>	
Local Authority Building Control (LABC)	<u>BSR0141</u>	(<u>QQ 82–96</u>), Lorna Stimpson, Chief Executive
Supplementary evidence	<u>BSR0170</u>	
Douglas Lockyer	<u>BSR0155</u>	
London Borough of Lambeth	<u>BSR0134</u>	
London Fire Brigade		(<u>QQ 26–37</u>), Pamela Oparaocha, Assistant Commissioner for Fire Safety
MIF Mobile UK	<u>BSR0169</u>	
The Mineral Products Association	<u>BSR0113</u>	
Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local	<u>BSR0138</u>	(<u>QQ 126–141</u>), Catherine Adams, Director, Building Systems and Insight in the Buildings, Resilience and Fire Group); Samantha Dixon MBE MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State; Andy Roe, Non-Executive Chair, Shadow Building Safety Regulator Board
Irwin Mitchell	<u>BSR0065</u>	
Joseph Morris	<u>BSR0020</u>	
National Federation of Roofing Contractors	<u>BSR0118</u>	
National Fire Chiefs Council	<u>BSR0066</u>	
National House Building Council (NHBC)	<u>BSR0133</u>	(<u>QQ 50–62</u>) Steve Evans, Head of Technical Operations
National Housing Federation (NHF)	<u>BSR0145</u>	

Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust	<u>BSR0154</u>	
Notting Hill Genesis	<u>BSR0044</u>	
OakNorth.	<u>BSR0073</u>	
Office for Product Safety and Standards	<u>BSR0172</u>	(<u>QQ 97–109</u>), Duncan Johnson, Deputy Director for Construction Products; Graham Russell MBE, Chief Executive
Olympian Homes	<u>BSR0153</u>	
Open Society Foundations	<u>BSR0049</u>	
Orbit	<u>BSR0090</u>	
Chris O’ Regan	<u>BSR0074</u>	
Mrs R Parfitt	<u>BSR0018</u>	
Principle Estate Management	<u>BSR0036</u>	
The Property Institute	<u>BSR0105</u>	
Florentina Punga	<u>BSR0028</u>	
Rendall and Rittner	<u>BSR0064</u>	
Ridge and Partners LLP	<u>BSR0142</u>	
Riskflag	<u>BSR0057</u>	
Rockwool Ltd	<u>BSR0081</u>	
Royal Berkshire Hospital Foundation Trust	<u>BSR0014</u>	
Royal Institute of British Architects	<u>BSR0137</u>	
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors		(<u>QQ 50–62</u>), Gary Strong, Global Building Standards Director
Pareto Projects Limited	<u>BSR0080</u>	
Syprian Pitkin	<u>BSR0007</u>	
Procure Plus	<u>BSR0084</u>	
The Property Institute	<u>BSR0105</u>	
Prospect	<u>BSR0109</u>	
Quintain,		(<u>QQ 1–13</u>), Matt Voyce, Executive Director, Construction
Salus Buiding Control and Fire Safety Consultants	<u>BSR0059</u>	
Sanctuary	<u>BSR0120</u>	
Michael Sanders	<u>BSR0004</u>	

Scape living Plc	<u>BSR0040</u>
Peter Shattock.	<u>BSR0016</u>
Sheffield Property Association	<u>BSR0148</u>
Siderise Group	<u>BSR0043</u>
Solaris Real Estate Limited	<u>BSR0001</u>
Southern Housing	<u>BSR0085</u>
Pamela Street	<u>BSR0114</u>
Bernard Taylor Partnership	<u>BSR0067</u>
techUK.	<u>BSR0127</u>
Thomson Brothers	<u>BSR0062</u>
Topek Limited	<u>BSR0003</u>
Dr Tariq Umar.	<u>BSR0022</u>
Unite Group PLC .	<u>BSR0132</u>
Unite Students	<u>BSR0078</u>
Urban Vision Real Estate Limited	<u>BSR0017</u>
Vastint UK	<u>BSR0158</u>
Vistry West London	<u>BSR0071</u>
Neil Walton	<u>BSR0056</u>
Warwick-Drive-(Barnes)- Management-Company-Limited	<u>BSR0031</u>
Wates Group	<u>BSR0122</u>
Shaun Williams.	<u>BSR0010</u>
Geoff Wilkinson	<u>BSR0011</u>
Anthony-Willis	<u>BSR0032</u>
YourTribe	<u>BSR0108</u>

APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

Background

Following the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, the Government commissioned Dame Judith Hackitt to conduct an Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. The Review's final report, published in 2018, recommended the establishment of a new regulatory framework focused on higher-risk residential buildings, managed by a new regulator with responsibility for the whole of a building's safety. The Building Safety Regulator (BSR) was set up to act as this new regulator as part of the Building Safety Act 2022.

The BSR has been set up within the Health and Safety Executive and is responsible for setting standards for the design and construction of higher-risk buildings. Higher-risk buildings have been defined as buildings that are at least 18 metres in height or have at least seven storeys and contain at least two residential units. For lower-risk buildings, the BSR does not directly approve their construction but is responsible for regulating the building control bodies and inspectors that do hold this responsibility. Concerns have been raised by some in the housing sector that delays in approvals by the BSR have slowed down the delivery of new buildings and homes.

Areas of interest

1. What is your experience of the Building Safety Regulator's regulatory framework? Has the introduction of the BSR improved the safety of the buildings it is responsible for, and can any examples be given to illustrate this?
2. How has the Building Safety Regulator's (BSR's) regulatory framework impacted the delivery of new homes and the maintenance and improvement of existing high-rise buildings?
3. What impacts could the BSR's regulatory framework have on the delivery of the Government's housing targets? How significant are high-rise buildings to meeting these housing targets? As an obstacle to meeting these targets, how does building safety regulation compare with other potential obstacles such as skills, supply chains and the planning system?
4. Does the Building Safety Regulator's regulatory framework strike the right balance between providing a holistic, outcomes-based view of safety and ensuring that developers and building owners understand what they are required to do?
5. To what extent are delays in approvals for high-rise buildings down to the regulatory processes used by the BSR? Could these processes be made more proportionate, particularly for smaller works, without impacting the safety of high-rise buildings? If so, how?
6. Are the BSR's approval processes sufficiently clear and understandable to developers? What level of guidance or feedback is necessary for those making applications to the BSR to understand its requirements? Could this situation be improved through the BSR's review of Approved Documents?
7. To what extent are delays caused by a poor understanding of building safety on the part of developers, leading to unsuitable applications? Should the solution to delays be a greater awareness of how to take a holistic approach to

safety on the part of developers, rather than more prescriptive guidance on regulatory requirements?

8. The BSR has suggested that it would like to carry out its work on an organisation-by-organisation basis, rather than the current system of looking at things building-by-building. Would you support a move to the BSR focusing on organisations, or would this lessen their focus on the safety of individual buildings?
9. To what extent are delays in approvals caused by the resources available to the regulator? Is there a need to give the BSR more funding, and if so, would developers accept an increase in regulatory fees to allow for this? Would more funding allow the BSR to deal with applications more swiftly, or is there a need to consider alternative financial models for delivering building safety approvals?
10. Does the BSR have access to the skilled staff necessary to carry out multidisciplinary assessments of safety? If the BSR is struggling to access the skills it needs, what changes could resolve this issue? For instance, is there a need for higher pay for those carrying out assessments, or for further changes to enable secondments?
11. How is the BSR progressing in improving the safety of all buildings, including low-rise buildings? Is the relationship between the BSR and building control authorities and inspectors working well?
12. To what extent are delays a result of growing pains that will ease over time, or a structural problem that requires more significant changes? What improvements to the BSR's regulatory framework are needed?
13. How does the Building Safety Regulator's work relate to the regulation of construction products? How does the BSR cooperate with the Office for Product Safety and Standards, and how might this relationship change with the introduction of a single construction regulator?
14. How does the Building Safety Regulator's regulatory framework compare to how building safety is assured in other countries and jurisdictions? Are there good examples of how to ensure building safety elsewhere, and what lessons can the BSR learn from them?

APPENDIX 4: ORGANISATIONS RELEVANT TO BUILDING SAFETY

Figure 2: Organogram

